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ABSTRACT 
Data breach notification laws have detailed numerous failures relating to the protection of 
personal information that have blighted both corporate and governmental institutions. 
There are obvious parallels between data breach notification and information privacy law as 
they both involve the protection of personal information. However, a closer examination of 
both laws reveals conceptual differences that give rise to vertical tensions between each law 
and shared horizontal weaknesses within both laws. Tensions emanate from conflicting 
approaches to the implementation of information privacy law that results in different 
regimes and the implementation of different types of protections. Shared weaknesses arise 
from an overt focus on specified types of personal information which results in ‘one size fits 
all’ legal remedies. The author contends that a greater contextual approach which promotes 
the importance of social context is required and highlights the effect that contextualization 
could have on both laws.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Data breach notification laws appear to have been a successful addition to legal frameworks 
relating to the protection of personal information. They have highlighted numerous 
information security failings that have affected both corporate and governmental 
institutions.1 They have uncovered a major social problem that has the capacity to affect 
millions of citizens.2 They have highlighted that general levels of corporate information 
security practices are inadequate. It is not surprising that these apparent successes have been 
instrumental in the proliferation of data breach notification laws throughout the United 
States (US) and beyond. Only a handful of US state legislatures have not yet enacted a data 
breach notification law3 and it is possible that a federal law will be implemented this year.4
                                                     
1 See e.g. OPEN SECURITY FOUNDATION, Dataloss DB.  (2009), at http://datalossdb.org/about 
(detailing the numerous data breaches that have been notified since the inception of US state-based 
notification laws). 
 
2 See e.g. PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, A Chronology of Data Breaches (2009), at 
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm#CP (suggesting that hundreds of 
millions of US citizens may have been affected by a data breach). 
3 Currently, only four states do not have a data breach notification law: Alabama, Kentucky, New 
Mexico and South Dakota. 
4 The Data Accountability and Trust Act of 2009, H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (2009) is the first bill to 
have passed a vote from one of the Houses of Congress. See INFORMATION LAW GROUP, House Passes 
Data Accountability and Trust Act (DATA).  (2009), at 
http://www.infolawgroup.com/2009/12/articles/data-privacy-law-or-regulation/house-passes-
data-accountability-and-trust-act-data/. It should also be noted that the Personal Data Privacy and 
Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th Cong (2009) has also been referred from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee to a full vote on the Senate floor. See also JAIKUMAR VIJAYAN, Federal Data-protection Law 
Inches Forward.  (2009), at 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9140408/Federal_data_protection_law_inches_forward. 
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Other jurisdictions have also followed suit, including the European Union (EU)5 and 
comprehensive proposals have been put forward in a number of other jurisdictions 
including Australia,6 Canada,7 New Zealand8 and the United Kingdom (UK).9
At face value, there are apparent similarities between data breach notification laws and 
information privacy laws as they both involve legal obligations relating to the protection of 
personal information.
 
10
                                                     
5 See Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2002/22/EC on 
universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, 
Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between 
national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws  (2009) [hereafter E-
PRIVACY DIRECTIVE]. See also MARK BURDON, et al., The Mandatory Notification of Data Breaches: Issues 
Arising for Australian and EU Legal Developments, 26 C.L.S.R 115, 120-123 (2010) (regarding an overview 
of the notification provisions of the new Directive) [hereafter “Burdon et al, Mandatory Notification of 
Data Breaches”] 
 Both laws seek to foster better security practices and have an 
information dissemination role that provides an individual with greater knowledge about 
how his or her information is stored and used. However, the development of data breach 
notification laws relates to a fundamental difference within information privacy legal 
regimes that is typically highlighted by distinctions between the sectoral approach to 
information privacy adopted by the US and the comprehensive approach to data protection 
6 See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice (2008) [hereafter AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE] (regarding the Australian Law 
Reform Commission’s proposal for an Australian data breach notification scheme). 
7 See Bill C-29 2010 (Can) (2010) (regarding a recent bill put before the Canadian House of 
Commons to implement a data breach notification scheme via the Personal Information Protection 
and Electronic Documents Act 2000 (Can)). See also DAVID T S FRASER, Breach Notification Amendments 
to PIPEDA Introduced in Parliament (2010), at http://blog.privacylawyer.ca/2010/05/breach-
notification-amendments-to.html. (regarding an overview of the proposed amendments); CANADIAN 
INTERNET POLICY AND PUBLIC INTEREST CLINIC, APPROACHES TO SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION: A 
WHITE PAPER, 36 (2007) (regarding a review of data breach notification in Canada). 
8 See LAW COMMISSION OF NEW ZEALAND, REVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT 1993: ISSUES PAPER 17 (2010) 
(regarding a recent review of the New Zealand Privacy Act and the possible introduction of a data 
breach notification scheme). 
9 The United Kingdom has taken a different track to data breach notification compared to other 
countries. A formal data breach notification scheme has been rejected by the Information 
Commissioner as notification of problems to the Commissioner was deemed to be a matter of existing 
good practice. See OUT-LAW NEWS, The UK Does Not Need a Data Breach Notification Law, says 
Government.  (2008), at http://www.out-law.com/page-9619. However, the Commissioner has been 
granted extra powers to award penalties of STG500,000 against organizations in breach of the Data 
Protection Act 1998 (UK), which includes data breaches. See Dan Raywood, Half a Million Pound 
Penalty Introduced for Personal Data Security Breaches by the Information Commissioner's Office, SC 
MAGAZINE, Jan. 13, 2010 http://www.scmagazineuk.com/half-a-million-pound-penalty-introduced-
for-personal-data-security-breaches-by-the-information-commissioners-office/article/161159/ 
(providing an overview of the introduction of the fine). 
10 See e.g. Prischia M. Regan, Federal Security Breach Notifications: Politics and Approaches, 24 
BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1103, 1106 (2009) (regarding data breach notification as a concern of sectoral 
information privacy law in the US). 
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adopted by the EU and other countries.11
Data breach notification laws were developed in the absence of a comprehensive data 
protection framework as a specific law for a particular problem,
 These distinctions manifest in different ways and 
this article identifies vertical tensions between both laws and shared horizontal weaknesses 
within both laws. 
12 whereas they are now 
being implemented within the generic rights-based frameworks founded on comprehensive 
approaches to data protection or information privacy.13 Data breach notification laws 
consequently not only attempt to fulfill a specific purpose, the mitigation of identity theft, 
but also have expansive conceptual aims originated on the conflicting goals of consumer 
protection and corporate compliance cost minimization. Comprehensive information 
privacy legal frameworks, on the other hand, have an expansive purpose, namely, to ensure 
legal protections related to the protection of personal information. Information privacy laws 
set minimum standards that relate to fair information practices and  provides individuals 
with a series of limited rights of involvement in the process of personal information 
exchange.14 The different developmental rationales behind encryption safe harbors for data 
breach notification demonstrate differences in the types of regulatory responses adopted by 
both laws. Data breach notification laws adopt market-based initiatives that are cognizant of 
corporate compliance cost burdens, whereas comprehensive information privacy laws adopt 
rights-based protections that favor individual interests over corporate requirements.15
Combined with vertical tensions, there are also shared horizontal weaknesses because both 
laws are predicated on overt information-based foundations.
 
16
                                                     
11 It should be noted that the concepts of information privacy and data protection are used 
interchangeably in this article although the author acknowledges differences between them.  
 Both laws focus too much on 
the type of information regulated rather than the social contexts and relationships that are 
12 See e.g. Jane Winn, Are 'Better' Security Breach Notification Laws Possible?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1133, 1134 (2009) (stating that data breach notification laws were developed as a response to identity 
theft in the absence of “a general right of information privacy”); Regan, supra note 10, at 1108 
(suggesting that the Californian law is a comprehensive remedy to resolve the problems of the US 
sectoral approach to information privacy). 
13 See generally, Burdon et al, supra note 5 (regarding the implementation of data breach 
notification in the comprehensive frameworks of the EU and Australia). 
14 See SIMON DAVIES, Re-Engineering the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has Been Transformed 
from a Right to a Commodity, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE, (PHILIP AGRE & 
MARC ROTENBERG EDS., 1997) (outlining a transition from privacy protection to data protection and the 
limits of individual rights). 
15 See e.g. Sara A. Needles, The Data Game: Learning to Love the State-Based Approach to Data Breach 
Notification Law, 88 N.C. L. REV. 267, 280-281 (2009) (regarding the distinction between data protection 
and data security perspectives and different emphases at the heart of data breach notification laws). 
16 See discussion at Part IV.C. 
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involved in the personal information generation and exchange processes. Regulatory 
responses are formed upon the creation of chains of accountability and “one size fits all” 
remedies. These chains are founded upon binary relationships involving three parties: a 
personal information provider, a personal information collector and a personal information 
re-user.17
Part II of this article provides a brief overview of the conceptual foundations and 
development of both information privacy and data breach notification law. Part III examines 
the conflicting vertical tensions and Part IV identifies the shared horizontal weaknesses of 
both laws. The purpose of this examination is to demonstrate underlying conceptual 
weaknesses of data breach notification and information privacy laws that are founded on an 
insufficient regard for the crucial role of social context and social relationships as the 
foundation of information exchange processes. Part V introduces notions of 
contextualization that promotes legal attention towards social relationships rather than 
specific types of information, which in turn, suggests a different approach to the 
conceptualization and application of both laws.  
 Problems occur in the application of both laws because the social process of 
information exchange can now involve more parties than envisaged by one-dimensional and 
largely static chains of accountability. Data breaches themselves provide illumination on this 
point as they typically involve the insertion of a third party auxiliary to the accountability 
framework created by both laws, as demonstrated by an overview of three illustrative data 
breaches. 
II. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS & LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
Later sections of this article will examine the conflicting tensions and shared weaknesses of 
both laws but before that analysis can take place it is necessary to briefly overview the 
conceptual foundations and legislative development of information privacy and data breach 
notification laws.  
A. INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 
The legal concept of information privacy is generally considered a sub-set of the many and 
multi-faceted theories of privacy that has been generated through the kaleidoscopic lens of 
                                                     
17 See Mark Burdon, Privacy Invasive Geo-Mashups: Privacy 2.0 and the Limits of First Generation 
Information Privacy Laws, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 101, (2010) [hereafter "First Generation Laws"]. 
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different authors and different academic disciplines.18 Attempts to answer the question 
“what is privacy?” in a meaningfully legal sense have generated a literature that is immense 
in its intellectual breadth, intense in its scholarly conviction and ingenious in its 
development of analytical frameworks. However, an answer to the question sought has not 
been forthcoming thus leading to a degree of despair about whether such an answer can 
ever be found.19 Conversely, attempts to answer the question “what is information privacy?” 
are much more coherent from a conceptual sense to the extent that information privacy laws 
have been implemented in many different legal jurisdictions.20
The concept of information privacy is generally associated with control theories of privacy 
that relate to an individual’s choice regarding the disclosure of his or her personal 
information.
  
21 One of the first and most influential representations of the control theory is 
Westin’s “Privacy and Freedom.”22 Westin did not use either the term “right” or “control” or 
even “information privacy” in his description of an individual’s required claim for 
information privacy23
                                                     
18 Philip Leith, The Socio-Legal Context of Privacy, 2 INT. J.L.C. 105, 108 (2006) (regarding the socio-
legal implications of privacy and the limits of information privacy); Herman T Tavani, Philosophical 
Theories of Privacy: Implications for an Adequate Online Privacy Policy, 38 METAPHILOSOPHY 1, 2 (2007) 
(reviewing the basis of different theories of privacy). 
 but his work has nonetheless been perceived as information privacy 
19 See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1-2 (Harvard University Press. 2008) 
(providing an overview of commentaries). See also Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. 
L.J., 2087 (2001) (commenting that the notion of privacy is so complex that it cannot be usefully 
conceptualized because it is so entangled with competing and contradictory dimensions); William M 
Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,  (1966) (doubting whether it 
is possible to define a ‘right of privacy’); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHILOS. PUBLIC 
AFF., 310 (1975) (contending that ideas about the right of privacy are so overlapped by other rights 
that it is indeterminable). 
20 COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, 8 (MIT Press [2nd and updated ed. 2006) [hereafter "GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY"] 
(regarding the policy goals of different jurisdictions “to give individuals greater control of the 
information that is collected, stored, processed, and disseminated about them” by organizations). 
21 See Tavani, supra note 18, at 7 (regarding an overview of key authors and theoretical 
applications); See e.g. Lisa Austin, Privacy and the Question of Technology, 22 L. & PHIL. 119, 125 (2003). 
(stating that individual control of personal information has been a key tenet of information privacy 
laws and has been a significant driver of conceptual development.); COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING 
PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, 14 (Cornell 
University Press. 1992) (regarding the analogous links between “data protection” and Westin’s 
information privacy).  
22 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (Atheneum. 1967). 
23 See contra Id. at 7 (regarding Westin’s “right of individual privacy” which is defined as “the right 
of the individual to decide for himself, with only extraordinary exceptions in the interests of society, 
when and on what terms his acts should be revealed to the general public”). 
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provides individual rights of control over personal information.24 In Privacy and Freedom, 
Westin determined four basic states of individual privacy: solitude, intimacy, anonymity and 
reserve.25
“creation of a psychological barrier against unwanted intrusion; this occurs 
when the individual’s need to limit communication about himself is 
protected by the willing discretion of those surrounding him.”
 The latter state, reserve, is of most interest regarding information privacy as it 
requires the:  
26
The need for barriers is necessary as the communication of the self is always incomplete. The 
requirements of societal involvement mean require individuals are required  to retain some 
information about them which is too personal for other persons or organizations to 
possess.
  
27 This mental distance, the space generated by choosing not to declare everything 
about one’s self, requires an individual to have the ability and control to withhold or to 
disclose personal information. The ability of choice over our own information is 
consequently the “dynamic aspect of privacy in daily interpersonal relations.”28
Westin also adduced four specific functions of privacy that reflect the value or purpose of 
privacy within society.
  
29 They are: Personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation and 
limited and protected communication.30 Again, the latter function is of relevance and it has two 
facets. The first, limited communication sets interpersonal boundaries for the exchange of 
personal information. The second, protected communication, “provides for sharing personal 
information with trusted others.”31
                                                     
24 See e.g. RAYMOND WACKS, PERSONAL INFORMATION: PRIVACY AND THE LAW 14  (Clarendon Press; 
Oxford University Press 1993) (noting the influence of Privacy and Freedom in relation to privacy as 
control definitions of privacy”); JAMES WALDO, et al., ENGAGING PRIVACY AND INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY IN A DIGITAL AGE, 60 (National Academies Press. 2007) (highlighting Westin’s role in the 
development of the concept of information privacy); JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY IN PERIL, 22 (Oxford 
University Press. 2007) (regarding the influence of Westin’s work and the need to regulate 
organizational data systems in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s). 
 It is the state of reserve in conjunction with limited and 
protected communication that is inherent in Westin’s definition of information privacy  
25 WESTIN, supra note 22, at  31-32. 
26 Id. at 32. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.   
29 Id. at 32-39. 
30 Id. 
31 See Stephen Margulis, T., On the Status and Contribution of Westin's and Altman's Theories of 
Privacy, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 411, 413 (2003). 
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“Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others.”32
Information privacy law is consequently based on the notion that individuals have rights 
relating to control over their personal information,
 
33 or at least, have rights pertaining to 
who can access their personal information34 or a combination of both.35 However, the 
“privacy as control paradigm”36 is not without its critics. Schwartz highlights that whilst the 
control model has benefits because it seeks “to place the individual at the centre of decision-
making about personal information use”37 it nonetheless suffers from several major flaws 
because it pays little consideration to information asymmetries38
                                                     
32 WESTIN, supra note 
 and it is founded on the 
22, at 7. 
33 See e.g. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (stating that privacy regards “the 
control we have over information about ourselves”); Arthur R Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer 
Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1107 
(1968) (“the basic attribute of an effective right to privacy is the individual’s ability to control the flow 
of information concerning or describing him”); Randall P Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: 
Privacy, News and Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1135 (1992) (advancing a “concept of 
privacy based on the individual’s control of information”); JERRY KANG, Information Privacy in 
Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1203 (1998) (referring to an individual’s control over the 
processing of personal information); PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL 
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 9 (University of North Carolina Press. 1995) [hereinafter “LEGISLATING 
PRIVACY” (commenting that privacy, in regard to US governmental collection of personal data, was 
defined as the “right of individuals to exercise some control over the use of information about 
themselves”). 
34 See e.g. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980) (contending that 
privacy is a concern of accessibility that includes physical access by and the attention of other 
individuals); RULE, supra note 24, at  3. (“Let me define privacy as the exercise of an authentic option 
to withhold information on one’s self.”); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1087, 1110 (2002) (stating that information privacy as the right to “control-over-information can be 
viewed as a subset of the limited access conception”); DAVID ARCHARD, The Value of Privacy, in 
PRIVACY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 16, (Erik Claes, et al. eds., 2006) (stating that the concept of limited 
access to a specified personal domain is the most plausible notion of privacy). 
35 See e.g. JAMES H. MOOR, Towards a Theory of Privacy in the Information Age, 27 COMP. & SOC.  
(outlining the restricted access/limited control approach to privacy). 
36 PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 820 (2000). 
37 Id. at 822. 
38 Id. at 830 (regarding privacy as control as the “commodification illusion”). 
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idea that personal information can mistakenly be construed as property.39 Regan also states 
that Westin’s work is too individualistic which leads to the conclusion that Westin regarded 
“privacy as fundamentally at odds with social interests”40 when that is clearly not the case.41 
Moreover, criticism is leveled at privacy as control from the seemingly tautological 
perspective that privacy as control is either too broad or too narrow.42
The conceptual reach of privacy as control has also been subject to criticism particularly 
regarding issues of individual consent. Allen contends there is a fundamental disconnect 
between what can be considered as having control over personal information and the 
requirements of a sufficient state of privacy because the former is not necessarily a 
constituent element of the latter.
  
43 Instead, privacy as control directs attention to issues of 
consent and choice about uses of personal information that connote an element of 
inaccessibility separate from privacy considerations.44 Finally, the control aspect of 
information privacy has also been subject to criticism.45
                                                     
39 The notion of personal information as property has been a controversial aspect of the 
information privacy law literature. See e.g. WESTIN, supra note 
 Simitis contends that privacy 
considerations no longer arise out of individual problems but they instead express conflicts 
7, at  324-325 (introducing the notion 
that personal information can be classed as property). See also Lawrence Lessig, Privacy as Property, 69 
SOC. RES., 261 (2002) (comparing privacy protection to intellectual property protection and the 
propertization of privacy “to allow individuals to differently value their privacy”) Richard S Murphy, 
Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. (1996) (outlining an 
economic theory of personal information as property). See contra Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: 
Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1390 (2000) (“Juxtaposing the data 
privacy debate with the politics of intellectual property thus exposes an ideological fault line within 
the transaction costs approach to designating property interests”); CORIEN PRINS, Property and Privacy: 
European Perspectives and the Commodification of our Identity, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 249, 
(Lucie M. C. R. Guibault & P. B. Hugenholtz eds., 2006) (regarding the difficulties in assigning value 
to personal information); Sonia Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222, 242 (2004) (stating a 
weakness of the propertization of privacy concept is that it is grounded in notions of real property 
which do not extend to cyberspace).  
40 REGAN, LEGISLATING PIVACY, supra note 33, at 28. See also BENNETT & RAAB, Governance of 
Privacy, supra note 20, at 50 (contending that Westin undertook a functional view regarding his 
investigation of privacy for an individual); Margulis, supra note 31, at 413 (stating that Westin’s work 
takes an individualistic perspective about the societal role of information privacy). 
41 REGAN, LEGISLATING PIVACY, supra note 33, at 220 (“I argue that privacy’s importance does not 
stop with the individual and that recognition of the social importance of privacy will clear a path for 
more serious policy discourse about privacy and for the formulation of more effective public policy to 
protect privacy”). 
42 See Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 34, at 1112 (contending that privacy as control is 
too vague due to the failure to define the types of information that individuals should control whilst 
other theories overcompensate and becoming too limiting).  
43 See Anita L Allen, Privacy as Data Control: Conceptual, Practical and Moral Limits of the Paradigm, 32 
CONN. L. REV. 861, 867-8 (2000) (regarding the differences between physical and informational 
privacy). 
44 Id. at 869 (stating that informational privacy involves information in a state of inaccessibility). 
45 See Austin, supra note 21, at 125. 
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that affect everyone. Information privacy is thus not simply a problem of individual control 
over information.46
Despite these trenchant criticisms, the concept of privacy as control was the basis for 
information privacy legislation
 
47 and the development of what we recognize as “data 
protection”48 or “information privacy”49 or even “privacy”50 laws. Three legal instruments, 
developed in the 1970s and 1980s, have been integral to the development of information 
privacy law as we know it today.51 In Europe, the Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data by Council of Europe52 was a cornerstone for 
the European Union’s subsequent Data Protection Directive.53 In the US, an influential 
report produced by the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare54 led to the 
implementation of the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Code of Fair Information Practice for 
Federal Government Agencies.55 Finally, The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) developed guidelines56
                                                     
46 Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 707, 709 (1987). 
 for member countries relating to the transfer 
47 BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 8 (commenting that the policy 
problem of “privacy” settled on the concept of information privacy). 
48 See e.g. DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC ON THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO THE 
PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA AND ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF SUCH DATA  (1995) [hereafter 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 95/46]; DATA PROTECTION ACT 1998 (UK). 
49 See e.g. INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT 2000 (Vic) (Austrl.); INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT 2009 (Qld) 
(Austrl.). 
50 See e.g. PRIVACY ACT 1988 (Cth) (Austrl.); PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
51 See RULE, supra note 24, at 25-27 (regarding the effect of the three instruments on the overall 
development of information privacy law); BENNETT supra note 21, at 95-101 (regarding the 
development of fair information principles through different international legal instruments). 
52. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 
28, 1981, Europ. T.S. 108, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm.  
53  COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 95/46. 
54. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: 
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973), 
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/DATACNCL/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm [hereafter HEW 
REPORT].  
55. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, et al., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (Aspen Publishers 2nd ed. 2006) (citing 
HEW REPORT at 23–30, 41–42). 
56. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/ 
18/0,2340,es_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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of personal information between member states which is a significant driver regarding the 
formulation of member state national legislation.57
The originating legal instruments and subsequent laws have many common features.
 
58 They 
are imbued on a principle of fairness and they adopt organizational-oriented controls 
relating to the process of personal information processing.59 A series of “fair information 
practices”60 or “information privacy principles”61 stipulate minimum standards regarding 
the collection, storage and use of personal information by data collecting organizations have 
thus been developed to regulate the process of personal information exchange.62
B. DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAW 
 However, 
whilst the genesis of information privacy laws can be traced back to these three roots 
causing subsequent laws to share similar features, a fundamental divergence has occurred 
that entails the sectoral approach adopted by the US and the comprehensive approach 
adopted by the EU and non-EU states of the OECD, as outlined in Part III.A.  
Although forms of mandatory data breach notification existed prior to the development of 
US state-based laws,63
                                                     
57. See Michael Kirby, Twenty-five Years of Evolving Information Privacy Law--Where Have We Come 
From and Where Are We Going?, 21 PROMETHEUS 467 (2003) (regarding implementation of the 
Guidelines in Australia and New Zealand); LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING 
ITS RATIONALE, LOGIC AND LIMITS 32 (KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL 2002) (noting that the treaty has 
been ratified by twenty-seven member states);  
 the inception of these laws are normally associated with US state-
based legislatures, particularly the California data breach notification law which was 
58 See BYGRAVE, supra note 57, at 32; REBECCA A. GRANT & COLIN J. BENNETT, VISIONS OF PRIVACY: 
POLICY CHOICES FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 6  (UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS. 1999). 
59. See e.g., RULE, supra note 24, at 27 (“the workings of personal data systems [are] open, 
accountable, and subject to known rules of due process”). See also VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, 
Generational Development of Data Protection in Europe, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW 
LANDSCAPE, 221, (Philip Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (describing the European advances in 
data storage and protection). 
60 See e.g. ROBERT GELLMAN, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW 
LANDSCAPE, 195-202, (Philip Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (regarding the development of fair 
information practices arising out of the HEW Report and subsequent implementation through the 
Privacy Act 1974). 
61 See e.g. GRAHAM GREENLEAF, et al., Strengthening Uniform Privacy Principles: An Analysis of the 
ALRC's Proposed Principles  at 
http://www.bakercyberlawcentre.org/ipp/publications/papers/ALRC_DP72_UPPs_final.pdf. 
(regarding the application of Australia’s privacy principles). 
62 See e.g. BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 12 (outlining the impact of 
fair information practices on the jurisdictional development of information privacy law). 
63 See e.g. Ethan Preston & Paul Turner, The Global Rise of a Duty to Disclose Information Security 
Breaches, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 457, 465 (2004) (regarding security breach notification 
under the EU’s e-Privacy Directive which came into force in 2002).  
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enacted in 2003.64 That law requires any California business that has suffered a data breach, 
or believes that it has suffered a data breach that entails an unauthorized acquisition of 
unencrypted and computerized personal information, to notify California residents about 
the incident.65 Individuals are to be notified within a timeframe that is expedient and 
without reasonable delay.66 Notification can take different forms including by letter, 
electronic notification or substitute notice67 which entails “conspicuous posting”68 on the 
organization’s website or via state media sources. However, some data breaches are exempt 
from notification. These include “good faith acquisitions”69 of personal information by an 
employee or agent of the breached entity70 or encrypted personal information.71 The type of 
personal information required to be notified also provides a limiting factor. Unlike 
information privacy laws, data breach notification laws have specific requirements as to 
what constitutes information to be regulated.72
                                                     
64 CAL. CIV. CODE §.1789.29(a) (West 2003). 
  
65 CAL. CIV. CODE §.1789.29(a) (West 2003). 
66 However, law enforcement agencies can request a delay if notification would impede a criminal 
investigation. See CAL. CIV. CODE §.1789.29(a) (West 2003). Time frames also vary between different 
states. See e.g. (within 45 days) FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 
(West 2005);  (as quickly as possible) WIS. STAT. § 895.507 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716 (2006); 
6 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 12B-101 (2005); IDAHO CODE § 28-51-104 (Michie 2006). 
67 Under the Californian law, substitute notice is only available if the data breach involved more 
than half a million individuals or would exceed a cost of over $250,000. Other states vary on this 
point. See e.g. HAW. REV. STAT §§ 487N-1 (2007) (breach involves over 200,000 persons and cost 
exceeds more than $100,000) and N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-C:19 (2007) (breach involves over 
1,000 persons and cost exceeds more than $5,000). 
68 See e.g. CAL. CIV. CODE §.1789.29(3)(B) (West 2003)  
69  See e.g. CAL. CIV. CODE §.1789.29(d) (West 2003) 
70 See e.g. CAL. CIV. CODE §.1789.29(a) (West 2003); FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (2005); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. § 895.507 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716 (2006); 
6 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 12B-101 (2005); ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (Michie 2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§ 44-7501 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 (Michie 2005); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3851 (2007); 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-911 (2005); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/1 (2005); IND. CODE §§ 24-4.9-3-1 
(2006); MD. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3501 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS 93H §1 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 
87-801 (2006)  ; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 603A.010 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163 (West 2006); N.Y. 
GEN. BUS. LAWS §§ 899-aa (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-30-01 (2005); OKLA. STAT. § 74-3113.1 
(2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.600 (2007); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2303 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-
1-90 (Law Co-op 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2101 (2005); TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE. §§ 
48.001 (2005)  ; WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010 (2005); W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-2A-101 (2008). 
71 See e.g. Mark Burdon, et al., Encryption Safe Harbours and Data Breach Notification Laws, 26(5) 
C.L.S.R, (2010) (forthcoming) [hereafter "Burdon et al., Encryption Safe Harbors". 
72 This point is covered in depth below at Part IV.A. 
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The purpose of the California law and most other subsequent data breach notification laws 
is directly linked to the mitigation of identity theft.73 The law was introduced to the 
California legislature as Senate Bill 1386 (hereafter “SB1386”) but at its point of introduction, 
SB1386 bore no resemblance to the data breach notification law that it would eventually 
evolve into.74 However, a radical re-write was undertaken following a computer hacking 
incident at a data processing warehouse maintained by the California State Government.75 
An unidentified intruder gained access to the Government’s information systems and 
retrieved the personal information of approximately 265,000 California public servants.76 An 
informational hearing into the incident was held and it became apparent that the state 
government delayed notification to its employees.77 Presented evidence attributed several 
attempts of identity theft to the data breach.78
                                                     
73 See e.g. CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF PRIVACY PROTECTION, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES ON NOTICE OF 
SECURITY BREACH INVOLVING PERSONAL INFORMATION, 6 (2008) (“One of the most significant privacy 
laws in recent years is the California law intended to give individuals early warning when their 
personal information has fallen into the hands of an unauthorized person, so that they can take steps 
to protect themselves against identity theft or to mitigate the crime’s impact”); Amanda Draper, 
Identity Theft: Plugging the Massive Data Leaks with a Stricter Nationwide Breach-notification Law, 40 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 681, 686 (2007) (noting that high profile data breaches in credit card processing 
corporations have been an incentive for the development of new laws); Kenneth M Siegel, Protecting 
the Most Valuable Corporate Asset: Electronic Data, Identity Theft, Personal Information, and the Role of Data 
Security in the Information Age, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 779, 781 (2007) (highlighting the identity theft risks 
that can arise from a single data breach); Regan, Federal Security Breach Notifications: Politics and 
Approaches, supra note 
 As a consequence of the breach, SB1386 was 
10, at 1105-1106 (regarding the impact that major data breaches had on 
Congressional developments relating to a national data breach notification law); Lilia Rode, Database 
Security Breach Notification Statutes: Does Placing the Responsibility on the True Victim Increase Data 
Security?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1621 (2007) (“California’s Notification Act has an admirable goal to 
curb identity theft”) Needles, supra note 15, at 281 (2009) (“Much of data breach law has been enacted 
to deal with the threat of identity theft resulting from unauthorized access of computerized records”); 
Jennifer Chandler, A. , Negligence Liability for Breaches of Data Security, 23 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 223, 
229 (2008) (highlighting potential mitigation benefits in relation to identity theft). 
74 See Senate Bill No. 1386 (Introducted) (2002), at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01-
02/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386_bill_20020212_introduced.pdf (a bill concerned with exempting 
the disclosure of personal information under the auspices of Californian freedom of information law). 
See also Joseph Simitian, How a Bill Becomes Law, Really, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009 (2009) (regarding 
the background development of some of the key issues relating to notification under the Californian 
law). 
75 ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, Senate Bill No. 1386 (Committee Report) (2002), at 
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_1351-
1400/sb_1386_cfa_20020617_141710_asm_comm.html. See also Preston & Turner, supra note 63, at 459 
(regarding the effect on the attack on the development of the law); Timothy H Skinner, California’s 
Database Breach Notification Security Act: The First State Breach Notification Law is Not Yet a Suitable 
Template for National Identity Theft Legislation, 10 RICH. J. LAW & TECH., 4 (2003) (confirming the impact 
of the breach on the law’s development); JWinn, supra note 12, at 1142-1143 (2009) (providing a brief 
outline of the background development to California’s law). 
76 ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, supra note 75. 
77 See SKINNER, supra note 75, at 4 (regarding details of the delay). 
78 See Id. at 5 (providing details of the hearing in which attempts at identity theft were examined 
but could not be conclusively tied to the data breach). 
 14 
therefore radically re-drafted and was redesigned to provide immediate notification for the 
purposes of identity theft mitigation.79  Despite the fact that data breach notification laws are 
designed to mitigate identity theft, subsequent research critically questions whether the link 
between data breaches and identity theft is as strong as initially indicated.80
The California law dramatically impacted the uptake of data breach notification laws in 
other state legislatures..
   
81 A majority of state-based laws are largely based on the California 
model,82 but some state laws have adopted different notification triggers.83
                                                     
79 See e.g. SIMITIAN, supra note 
 Acquisition 
based triggers, such as the California law, have a relatively low triggering threshold that 
triggers an obligation to notify when an organization has suffered, or believes it has suffered 
74, at 1011 (regarding the impetus for legislative action following the 
data breach). 
80 See e.g. JAVELIN STRATEGY AND RESEARCH, DATA BREACHES AND IDENTITY FRAUD: 
MISUNDERSTANDING COULD FAIL CONSUMERS AND BURDEN BUSINESSES (2006) (conducting a study of 
identity theft victims which demonstrated that a small percentage was linked to data breaches); 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PERSONAL INFORMATION: DATA BREACHES ARE 
FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS 
UNKNOWN. NO. GAO-07-737, (2007) (reviewing 24 of large data breaches to find little evidence of 
concomitant identity theft incidents); Sasha Romanosky, et al., DO DATA BREACH DISCLOSURE LAWS 
REDUCE IDENTITY THEFT? (SSRN. 2008) (analyzing identity theft complaints from victims and finding 
little evidence that data breach notification laws reduce the frequency of identity theft incidents); 
Brendan St. Amant, Misplaced Role of Identity Theft in Triggering Public Notice of Database Breaches, 44 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS., 527 (2007) (“The currently favored cost-benefit analysis that links security breaches 
to identity theft obscures the central policy issue of what actual rights citizens should have over the 
whereabouts and release of their personal information”); FRED H. CATE, Information Security Breaches: 
Looking Back and Thinking Ahead.  (2008), at 
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details/FileUpload265/2308/Information_Security_Breaches
_Cate.pdf (“Identity fraud and security breaches are both certainly important issues, but there is little 
evidence connecting the two, especially in the case of true identity theft”). 
81 See Burdon, et al., Mandatory Notification of Data Breaches, supra note 5, at 117 (chronicling the 
uptake of data breach notification laws post the inception of the Californian law). See also Flora J 
Garcia, Data Protection, Breach Notification, and the Interplay between State and Federal Law: The 
Experiments Need More Time, 17 FORDHAM INTEL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 693, 707-708 (2007) 
(regarding the rapid proliferation of state-based data breach notification laws). 
82 CAL. CIV. CODE §.1789.29(a) (West 2003); FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (2005); WIS. STAT. § 895.507 
(2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716 (2006); 6 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 12B-101 (2005); IDAHO CODE § 
28-51-104 (Michie 2006); ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (Michie 2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 
(Michie 2005); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-911 (2005);8 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/1 (2005); NEV. REV. 
STAT. §§ 603A.010 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163 (West 2006); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAWS §§ 899-aa 
(2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-30-01 (2005); OKLA. STAT. § 74-3113.1 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-
1-90 (Law Co-op 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2101 (2005); TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE. §§ 
48.001 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010 (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b (2006); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:3071 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61 (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500 
(2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-1 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-42-101 (2006). 
83 See Kathryn E Picanso, Protecting Information Security Under a Uniform Data Breach Notification 
Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 383 (2006) (outlining states with a reasonable risk of harm trigger); 
Michael E Jones, Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private Sectors, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y 
FOR INFO. SOC'Y 555, 571-572 (2007) (detailing the use of risk based triggers in federal data breach 
proposals). 
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a breach.84 Risk based triggers, on the other hand, attempt to raise the triggering threshold to 
minimize the threat of unnecessary notification.85 These triggers have a range of different 
standards that include a reasonable likelihood of harm or material harm,86 a reasonable 
likelihood of substantial economic loss,87 a significant or material risk of identity theft or 
other frauds88 and whether a data breach has or is reasonably likely to cause loss or injury.89
Whilst laws have been enacted at the state level, the situation at the federal level in the US 
has some parallels to state-based law. First, there was an explosion of interest in data breach 
notification law that lead to a proliferation of legal proposals in 2005which has continued 
until the present time.
  
90 None of these bills have been enacted yet although this may be 
about to change.91 The purposes of the bills varied. For example,  some bills sought to 
develop a national, federal-based data breach notification law to supplant state-based laws.92
                                                     
84 See Jones, supra note 
 
83, at 562 (regarding the elements of acquisition based triggers that are 
deemed to favor consumer protection because notification is not left to the breached entity); Paul M 
Schwartz & Edward J Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 933 (2007) 
(commenting the Californian law “is marked by a low threshold for notification”). 
85 See CATE, supra note 80, at 13 (“Requiring breach notices in situations other than those in which 
they are realistically likely to prevent or mitigate harm or serve some other clearly articulated 
valuable function threatens to exacerbate the existing tendency of recipients to ignore those notices”); 
MICHAEL TURNER, Towards a Rational Personal Data Breach Notification Regime. (2006), at 
http://www.infopolicy.org/files/downloads/data_breach.pdf. (“At some point, consumers begin to 
discount notices if the average likelihood that a breach will result in damage is very low”); Jones, 
supra note 83, at 562 (regarding risk based triggers that are deemed to favor corporate interests 
because the decision to notify or not is left squarely with the breached organization). 
86 See e.g. FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (2005); ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (Michie 2009); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 4-110-105 (Michie 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.600 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b 
(2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:3071 (West 2005); IOWA CODE § 715C.1 (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§§ 75-60 (2005).   
87 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-7501 (2007). 
88 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. § 895.507 (2006); MD. CODE 
ANN. §§ 14-3501 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS 93H §1 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-1 (2005); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-42-101 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 445.72 (2007). 
89 See 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2303 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72 (2007); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 30-14-1704 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (Michie 2008).  
90 See Regan, supra note 10, 1109-110 (outlining bills placed before both Houses of Congress). 
91 See supra note 4, and discussion. 
92 See e.g. DATA ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRUST ACT OF 2009, H.R. 2221, 111TH CONG. (2009); PERSONAL 
DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, S. 1490, 111TH CONG. (2009); DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION 
ACT OF 2009, S. 139, 111TH CONG. (2009). 
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Other bills  responded to specific data breach incidents93 and further bills covered certain 
industrial sectors, such as the data brokerage industry94 or Federal government agencies.95 
Second, the proposed federal bills share the underlying rationale of state-based laws that the 
primary function of data breach notification was to provide individuals with an opportunity 
to mitigate any potential adverse outcomes, thus assisting with the prevention of identity 
theft-related crimes.96
Accordingly, data breach notification laws attempt to fulfill two differing conceptual aims. 
First, the law primarily seeks to formally recognize that an individual has a “right to know” 
about unauthorized misuse of his or her personal information and notice of the incident 
enables mitigation of subsequent identity theft.
   
97 Smedinghoff contends that the reporting of 
personal information data breaches is akin to the common law duty to warn of dangers.98 
The duty requires a party who has a superior knowledge of a potential danger of injury or 
damage that could be inflicted upon another person, by a specific hazard, to warn persons 
who lack such knowledge.99
                                                     
93 See e.g. VETERANS' ID THEFT PROTECTION ACT OF 2006, H.R. 5487, 109TH CONG. (2006); 
COMPREHENSIVE CREDIT SERVICES FOR VETERANS ACT OF 2006, H.R. 5783, 109TH CONG. (2006); 
COMPREHENSIVE VETERANS' DATA PROTECTION AND IDENTITY THEFT PROTECTION ACT OF 2006, H.R. 
5588, 109TH CONG. (2006) (following the aftermath of a major data breach involving the US 
Government’s Department of Veterans Affairs). See also DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GENERAL, REVIEW OF ISSUES RELATED TO THE LOSS OF VA INFORMATION INVOLVING THE 
IDENTITY OF MILLIONS OF VETERANS. (2006) (for extensive details of the breach). 
 Data breach notification law was thus intended to provide an ex 
94 See e.g. IDENTITY THEFT BILL, H.R. 3140, 109TH CONG. (2005). 
95 See e.g. FEDERAL AGENCY DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION ACT OF 2006, H.R. 5838, 109TH CONG. 
(2006); FEDERAL AGENCY DATA BREACH PROTECTION ACT OF 2007, H.R. 2124, 110TH CONG. (2007). 
96 See e.g. PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, S. 1490, 111TH CONG. (2009) (“To 
prevent and mitigate identity theft, to ensure privacy, to provide notice of security breaches, and to 
enhance criminal penalties, law enforcement assistance, and other protections against security 
breaches, fraudulent access, and misuse of personally identifiable information”). 
97 See e.g. Rode, supra note 73, at 1621 (commenting that the purpose of the Californian law was to 
provide consumers with greater knowledge in order they could take action); Thomas J. Smedinghoff, 
Trends in the Law of Information Security, 17 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L. J. 1, 4 (2005) (stating that data 
breach notification laws are designed as a way to protect persons who may be adversely affected by a 
security breach); Needles, supra note 15, 280 (stating “Breach notification laws let individuals know 
that their data has slipped into unauthorized hands”); SCHWARTZ & JANGER, Notification of Data 
Security Breaches, supra note 84, at 917 (stating that breach notification can assist individuals and 
organizations to mitigate harm caused by a breach). 
98 THOMAS J SMEDINGHOFF, The State of Information Security Law: A Focus on the Key Legal Trends.  
(2009). 
99 Id.  
By requiring notice to persons who may be adversely affected by a security breach (e.g., 
persons whose compromised personal information may be used to facilitate identity theft), 
these laws seek to provide such persons with a warning that their personal information has 
been compromised, and an opportunity to take steps to protect themselves against the 
consequences of identity theft. 
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post protection for individuals and mandatory notification was deemed the regulatory tool 
to complete that task.100
Second, the auxiliary aim of the law is to encourage organizations to adopt better security 
practices.
  
101 Encryption safe harbors are a case point as they seek to encourage the wider 
adoption of encryption technologies for the storage and use of personal information.102 
However, notification also acts as a regulatory threat through the tool of reputational 
sanction as breached organizations  have to confess the incident to their customers.103 Both 
encouragement and threat elements are designed to ensure that sound information 
management procedures and practices become a management priority.104 This reflects the 
fact there was little market incentive for private sector organizations to behave responsibly 
and to report a data breach due to the negative publicity that would arise.105
                                                     
100 See Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection: 
Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1061, 1072-1074 (2009) (regarding an overview 
of information disclosure measures as an ex post mechanism in data breach notification laws). 
 As such, the 
101 See e.g. Id. (notification as an information disclosure mechanism is used to improve 
organizational security controls); Winn, supra note 75, at 1147-1148 (regarding the incentives for 
database owners to implement security measures); Rode, supra note 73, at 1624 (“notification 
statutes...serve as powerful incentives for businesses to attack identity theft at the front lines”); 
Skinner, supra note 75, at 7 (quoting Benjamin Wright “they [data breach notification laws] have 
powerful incentive (sic) to secure data from the beginning”); (Schwartz & Janger, Notification of Data 
Security Breaches, supra note 84, at 953-955 (regarding “reasonable security” measures that the “ideal 
data processing entity” would put in place from a data breach notification act). 
102 See generally Burdon et al, Encryption Safe Harbours, supra note 71 (providing a detailed critique 
of encryption safe harbors in data breach notification laws); MARK BURDON, et al., If its Encrypted its 
Secure! The Viability of US State-based Encryption Exemptions (IEEE ed., 2010) (analyzing encryption 
exemptions found in US state-based data breach notification laws against a factor-based safe harbor 
proposed in Australia and the EU); Winn, supra note 75, at 1145-1146 (critiquing the Californian law’s 
encryption safe harbor). See also Part III.B below. 
103 See e.g. Winn, supra note 75, at 1143 (stating that the “shaming function” of data breach 
notification laws is a “direct and concrete” element); Schwartz & Janger, Notification of Data Security 
Breaches, supra note 84, at 929-931 (detailing in depth the role of “reputational sanction” in data breach 
notification laws); Rode, supra note 73, at 1628 (regarding the disclosure of a security breach which 
can tarnish a company’s public image). 
104 See Schwartz & Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, supra note 84, at 926 (regarding the 
various forces that are formed under data breach notification law). 
105 See COMPUTER SECURITY INSTITUTE, COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY SURVEY. (2006) (detailing the 
reluctance of organizations to inform law enforcement agencies about a data breach); A ACQUISTI, et 
al., Is There a Cost to Privacy Breaches? An Event Study 4 (2006) (“a privacy incident is a negative 
externality that natural incentives do not correct”); Chandler, supra note 73, at 228 (regarding the lack 
of consumer interest in data breaches and the limited effect on share price as an effective deterrent to 
implement security measures); Rode, supra note 73, at 1631 (regarding the ineffectiveness of market 
based provisions when businesses miscalculate the value placed by individuals on privacy). See 
contra Jacob W Schneider, Preventing Data Breaches: Alternative Approaches to Deter Negligent Handling 
of Consumer Data, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 279, 291 (2009). (stating that the ineffectiveness of data 
breach notification as a legal remedy because it provides little market incentive to strengthen data 
security). 
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second aim of data breach notification law also has an ex ante element through the 
encouraged adoption of information security measures.106 Nevertheless these are two very 
different aims that arise from data breach incidents.107 Data breach notification laws 
therefore demand a delicate balancing act that requires gauging the risks of providing 
adequate notification to individuals while attempting to minimize corporate compliance cost 
burdens relating to unnecessary notification.108
C. SUMMARY 
   
This brief overview of the conceptual background and legislative development of both 
information privacy and data breach notification laws reveal similarities and differences 
between both legal concepts. Both laws have an obvious interest relating to the protection of 
personal information and they both attempt to provide individuals with a greater 
knowledge about the use of their personal information by organizations. Despite these 
obvious similarities, there are also significant differences between the two laws that go to the 
heart of both concepts and different legal frameworks. To outline these distinctions, the 
metaphor of vertical and horizontal is employed to determine tensions shared 
weaknesses.109
Fig.1 – Vertical Tensions and Horizontal Weaknesses 
 These issues are explored further in the next parts of this article and 
represented by figure 1 below.  
                                                     
106 See Romanosky & Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection, supra note 100 (regarding 
the ex ante role of security protections to reduce the numbers of future data breaches). 
107 See Needles, supra note 73, at 281 (noting the different purposes between data breach 
notification as “data control” and as a “privacy” concern); TURNER, supra note 85 (regarding the 
conflicting notions of notification to individuals and the use of notification as an incentive to 
strengthen security). 
108 See Schwartz & Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, supra note 84, at 918 (regarding the 
“important function of breach notification” after a breach that requires a “multi-institutional, co-
ordinated response”); Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, supra note 36; THOMAS J SMEDINGHOFF, 
Security Breach Notification - Adapting to the Regulatory Framework, 21 The Review of Banking & 
Financial Services 1, (2005).; TURNER supra note 85 (regarding the risks that organizations face in 
decision to notify or not to notify). 
109 See e.g. Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy Law, 118 YALE L. J., 872-873 (2009). 
(regarding the classification of dimensions relating to US information privacy law as vertical issues, 
such as the desirability of a comprehensive federal law over state-based laws and horizontal issues 
which regard “the interplay of any federal information privacy law with other sector-Specific federal 
rules”).   
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III. CONFLICTING VERTICAL TENSIONS 
Vertical tensions emanate due to the differing conceptual and developmental origins of both 
laws that ultimately represent the distinction between sectoral and comprehensive 
approaches to the regulation of information privacy.110
A. SECTORAL VERSUS COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES  
 The author asserts that the 
sectoral/comprehensive distinction also determines the form of regulatory remedy that is 
deemed appropriate which further highlight distinctions between market-based initiatives 
and rights-based protections that result in contradictory emphases over the minimization of 
corporate compliance costs. 
The implementation of information privacy laws have taken essentially different tracks 
despite the fact of their similar origins.111
                                                     
110 The author acknowledges that the distinction between sectoral and comprehensive frameworks 
is a broad categorization only and notes that some comprehensive laws also have aspects of sectoral 
regulation. See BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 
 That in itself is not surprising as a right to privacy 
20, at 132-133 (highlighting that 
the sectoral/comprehensive distinction is broad in its conceptual reach and that in practice several 
countries encompass aspects of both approaches within their legal systems). However, this broad 
distinction is sufficient for the purposes of this article because it demonstrates the different 
conceptual, normative and regulatory foundations of US data breach notification law when examined 
in conjunction with comprehensive information privacy regimes. 
111 See e.g. RULE, supra note 24, at 28-31 (outlining the differences and origins of jurisdictional 
privacy regimes). 
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is not perceived as an absolute right and thus the interpretation of what weight an 
individual’s right to control his or her personal information is in competition with other 
social rights and interests. The application of information privacy legal regimes is likely to 
be a matter of contestable discussion amongst different legislative jurisdictions.112 As such, 
information privacy laws are manifestations of political processes which have implications 
for the implementable scope of such laws.113 Jurisdictional information privacy laws 
therefore reflect the wider social, legal and policy values of individual jurisdictions.114
The sectoral approach
 The 
US attitude towards information privacy law and the developmental purpose of data breach 
notification laws reflect this point. 
115 to information privacy in the US has been characterized as 
“sporadic”116 and “reactive.”117 The regulatory focus of US information privacy law is the 
general curtailment of government powers in combination with laws that govern industry-
specific practices or various types of sensitive information.118
                                                     
112 See e.g. CHARLES RAAB, From Balancing to Steering: New Directions for Data Protection, in VISIONS 
OF PRIVACY: POLICY CHOICES FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 68, (Rebecca A. Grant & Colin J. Bennett eds., 1999) 
(regarding the limited role of a right to privacy which does not take precedence over all uses of 
personal information); REGAN, LEGISLATING PIVACY, supra note 
 The existence or non-existence 
33, at 16 (regarding privacy protection 
in the US as the balancing of individual and political interests); BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF 
PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 13 (stating that privacy is not an absolute right and is balanced against 
other community rights and obligations). 
113 BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 125 (contending that information 
privacy law is “an exercise of the power of the state in regulating the processing of personal data”). 
114 See BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY, supra note 21, at 242-243 (regarding the effect of different 
political philosophies on the implementation of information privacy legislation); PETER P. SWIRE & 
ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE 
EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 153 (Brookings Institution Press. 1998) (contending that different 
approaches to privacy protection reflect unique jurisdictional approaches). 
115 See GELLMAN, supra note 60, at 195 (describing sectoral as “no general privacy laws, just specific 
laws covering specific records or record keepers”); Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 
YALE L. J. 902, 910 (2009) (US information privacy laws “regulate information use exclusively on a 
sector-by-sector basis”). 
116 JOEL R REIDENBERG, The Globalization of Privacy Solutions: The Movement Towards Obligatory 
Standards for Fair Information Practices, in VISIONS OF PRIVACY: POLICY CHOICES FOR THE DIGITAL AGE, 
217, 236 (Rebecca A. Grant & Colin J. Bennett eds., 1999) (also stating that the lack of a coherent and 
systematic approach to information privacy protection in the US “presents an undesirable policy 
void”); John T Soma, et al., Corporate Privacy Trend: The "Value" of Personally Identifiable Information 
("PII") Equals the "Value" of Financial Assets, 25 RICH. J. LAW & TECH. 1, 15 (2009) (stating that US 
privacy regulation is best described as “a haphazard set of industry specific regulations...which 
frequently overlap and are often contradictory”); GELLMAN, supra note 60, at 195 (describing the legal 
structure for US privacy protection as a “patchwork quilt”). 
117 See BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at  37 (regarding reactivity as a 
weakness of sectoral regimes). 
118 See e.g. REIDENBERG, supra note 116, at 209 (stating that US federal and state information privacy 
laws target individual protection in relation to defined problems that arise from fear of government 
intervention and a reluctance to regulate industry). 
 21 
of information privacy regulation at the federal level is specific to particular circumstances 
or sectors. For example, the Privacy Act119 provides a range of fair information practices that 
US Government agencies must comply with regarding the handling of personal information. 
The Gramm Leach Bliley Act120 (GLBA) creates privacy protections for personal financial 
information within the specific remit of the financial services sector. The Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)121 consigns legal protections in relation to 
identifiable health information held in the medical and health insurance sectors. In a 
different vein, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)122
Alongside these sector-based laws, there are a collection of other laws that provide legal 
remedies for specific issues that  have become sufficiently politicized to warrant legislative 
action.
 governs restrictions 
on the collection of online personal information from children under the age of thirteen. 
123 For example, the Drivers Privacy Protection Act124 restricts the disclosure of driver 
license information by state authorities following the murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, in 
which, an assailant used publicly available driver license information to stalk and then 
murder Ms. Schaeffer.125 The DPPA has also been instrumental in restricting the sale of 
driver license information by state agencies to commercial entities.126 The Video Privacy 
Protection Act127
                                                     
119 THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552A. 
 protects personal information provided to video rental stores following a 
120 FINANCIAL SERVICES MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1999 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (1999). 
121 HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162 and 164 
(1996). 
122 CHILDREN’S ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT 15 U.S.C. § 6501–6506 (1998). 
123 BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 37.; REGAN, LEGISLATING PIVACY, 
supra note 33, at 199 (stating that congressional privacy legislation was based on various critical 
events which opened up a policy window); PRISCILLA REGAN, The United States, in GLOBAL PRIVACY 
PROTECTION: THE FIRST GENERATION 51, (James B. Rule & Graham Greenleaf eds., 2008) (“Generally it 
takes an incident to focus attention on the issue of information privacy – and such incidents tend to 
focus on one type of record system at a time”). 
124 DRIVERS PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1994 18 U.S.C. § 2725 (1994). 
125 See e.g. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY supra note, 19 at 69 (regarding the distinction 
between public and private data in the Schaeffer case); Garcia, supra note 81, at 715 (stating the 
“Schaeffer case is credited with sparking the passage of the Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act”). See also 
REGAN, LEGISLATING PIVACY supra note 33, at 207 (regarding the use of state driver license information 
to harass pregnant mothers who visited abortion clinics). 
126 See e.g. Michael A. Froomkin, Government Data Breaches, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1019, 1029 
(2009).; Garcia, supra note 81, at 715 (highlighting state revenues based from the sale of driver license 
information); REGAN, The United States, supra note 123, at 50 (summarizing the development of the 
DPPA). 
127 THE VIDEO PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 2710. 
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controversy involving Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork and the publication  of his video 
watching habits by the media.128
The myriad of information privacy legislation has also been replicated at state level.
  
129 Some 
states implement laws that provide general statutory rights of privacy that are akin to tort 
law protections and thus govern areas such as common law invasions of privacy.130 Other 
state laws, like their federal counterparts, have enacted a number of sectoral based laws, 
aimed at certain industry practices. For example, in addition to federal laws, some states 
have specifically legislated laws relating to the use of personal information in relation to 
certain information, such as video rental records, as highlighted above.131 Accordingly, 
Schwartz contends that a duopoly exists between federal and state laws in which federal 
laws deliver specified benchmarks which allow state laws further room for experimental 
development.132
Comprehensive legal frameworks, on the other hand, adopt a different approach to sectoral 
regimes. They establish information privacy rights for individuals and define obligations for 
data collecting organizations regardless of industrial sector.
   
133 Comprehensive frameworks 
have universal notions of the type of information that is covered by information privacy 
laws, typically defined as “personal data”134 or “personal information.”135 Moreover, the 
type of data covered by these laws is generally context dependent which means that 
different types of information can be personal information at different times depending 
upon the context upon which it is used.136
                                                     
128 See Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, supra note 
 The context dependent approach is a significant 
difference to sectoral laws that have a restrictive outlook of the type of information that will 
115, at 935-936 (providing a comprehensive 
overview to the development of the law including details of congressional outrage). 
129 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for Individual 
Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J.  195, 221 (1992) (commenting that state-based protections suffer from 
incompleteness and that vary from state to state). 
130 Id. at 228. 
131 See Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, supra note 115, at 919 (regarding state variants on the 
VPPA). 
132 Id.  See contra Bellia, supra note 109. 
133 See e.g. SWIRE AND LITAN, supra note 116, at 26-27 (regarding the “sweeping coverage” of EU’s 
Data Protection Directive to all sectors). 
134 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC, Art 2(a). 
135 S6(1) PRIVACY ACT 1988 (Cth) (Austrl.). 
136 See e.g. Mark Burdon & Paul Telford, The Conceptual Basis of Personal Information in Australian 
Privacy Law, 17 Murdoch Elaw Journal, 1 (2010) (regarding an overview of context independent and 
context dependent approaches in Australian privacy law) [hereafter “Conceptual Basis”]. See also 
SHARON BOOTH ET AL., WHAT ARE ‘PERSONAL DATA’? A STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE UK INFORMATION 
COMMISSIONER. (2004) (regarding a survey of data protection authorities and their conceptual 
construction of personal information). 
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constitute personal information. Hence, sectoral information privacy laws have developed 
context independent approaches related to the classification of personal information that 
reflect the restricted aims of industry or information specific legislation.  
Enforcement mechanisms operated by comprehensive information privacy regimes are also 
different to those found in sectoral regimes. Most comprehensive frameworks employ 
specific supervisory authorities with given sets of legislative powers to protect the rights of 
individuals and impose compliance obligations upon organizations and are seen as a 
necessary condition of an effective information privacy regime.137 Contrast that with the 
situation in the US, which does not have a dedicated supervisory authority for the 
enforcement of information privacy. Instead, governance obligations are dispersed amongst 
different public sector organizations that mirror the fragmented legislative focus of the US 
approach.138 Moreover, the lack of a unified commission is now seen as a detriment to the 
US approach to information privacy.139
Data breach notification laws have thus been developed within the sectoral environment of 
the US to provide a remedial fix to a given problem, namely, the mitigation of identity theft 
arising from data breaches of personal information.
 
140 However, a law that has a primary 
purpose of mitigating identity theft is fundamentally different from a law that is purposely 
designed to ensure the protection of personal information as found in comprehensive 
information privacy regimes.141
                                                     
137 BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 
 The former is designed to provide a particular remedy to a 
specific problem whilst the latter consigns broad rights to individuals regarding the 
personal information exchange process. The question consequently arises whether data 
breach notification laws should regard the protection of personal information per se, as 
information privacy laws do, rather focusing on than the specified remit of mitigating 
identity theft?  
20, at 113. 
138 For example, eight federal agencies have supervisory powers to enforce elements of the GLBA. 
They are the Federal Trade Commission; The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; The Federal 
Reserve Board; The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; The Office of the Thrift Supervision; The 
National Credit Union Administration; The Security and Exchange Commission and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission.  
139 See Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, supra note 115, at 927 (regarding one of the positive effects 
of a comprehensive law in the US). 
140 See Part II.B. 
141 See e.g. Winn, supra note 75, at 4 (regarding the potential limiting implications of data breach 
notification laws that predominantly focus on the mitigation of identity theft). 
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These are weighty normative distinctions for to do so require a major change in perspective, 
from both sectoral and comprehensive approaches, regarding the purpose of data breach 
notification. There is a clear conceptual foundation for a narrower approach to the 
protection of personal information in data breach notification laws that goes back to the first 
data breach notification law, California Civil Code 1729(a) and flows through to recent US 
state and federal developments. However, even in comprehensive jurisdictions, there has 
been a degree of reluctance to enmesh data breach notification completely within established 
legal frameworks.142 This has resulted in the EU’s data breach notification scheme being 
developed within the reduced scope of the e-Privacy Directive and the Australian Law 
Reform Commission’s proposal that has not only developed an ancillary definition of 
personal information for the specific purpose of data breach notification143 but has 
recommended that data breach notification not be formalized as a privacy principle.144
Data breach notification law, viewed from the perspective of the type of information privacy 
legal framework within which it operates, provides a contradictory picture about how it has 
been applied. In the US, data breach notification law is a comprehensive measure to remedy 
deficiencies arising from the sectoral approach to information privacy.
  
145 The 
comprehensiveness of the law is evident because it generally applies to all types of 
organization regardless of industrial sector.146
                                                     
142 See e.g. Burdon, et al., Mandatory Notification, supra note 
 However, the application of this 
comprehensive approach is nevertheless constrained by focusing notification to specified 
circumstances that could give rise to identity theft which involve certain types of combined 
personal information. Conversely, data breach notification law in comprehensive regimes is 
a sectoral measure to remedy deficiencies in the application of fair information practices or 
5, at 127 (regarding the reluctance of 
Austrlian and EU legislators to fully enmesh data breach notification within existing legal 
frameworks). 
143 See AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, at 1693. Specified personal 
information under the proposal  
“should draw on the existing definitions of ‘personal information’ and ‘sensitive information’ in 
the Privacy Act and should prescribe what combinations of these types of information would, 
when acquired without authorization, give rise to a real risk of serious harm requiring 
notification”.  
144 See NIGEL WATERS, et al., Intepreting the Security Principle, UNSW.  (2006), at 
http://www.cyberlawcentre.org/ipp/wp/WP1%20Security.pdf.  
145 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1114 (commenting that data breach notification law is framed in a 
security rather privacy paradigm to ameliorate the limits of US privacy law); Needles, supra note 73, 
at 288 (stating that state-based legislatures developed data breach notification laws in the absence of a 
federal data protection law). 
146 See e.g.Simitian, supra note 74, at 1015 (discussing the development of the California data breach 
notification law and its coverage of “public and private databases”).  
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information privacy principles that regard corporate obligations to secure personal 
information.147 In effect, the notifications resulting from the advent of data breach 
notification laws demonstrate that the application of security-related principles and 
practices simply are not working both in terms of the volume of incidents and the number of 
persons affected. Accordingly, data breach notification is either a comprehensive facet to a 
sectoral approach or a sectoral adjunct to a comprehensive regime.148
B. MARKET-BASED INITIATIVES VERSUS RIGHTS-BASED PROTECTIONS 
 These differences in 
application manifest in the scope of protections provided in sectoral and comprehensive 
regimes which place different priorities relating to the provision of individual protections 
and the minimization of corporate compliance costs. 
The manifestations of sectoral and comprehensive approaches highlight differences between 
both laws as they place alternate priorities about the role of organizational compliance cost 
mitigation. Data breach notification laws tend to adopt market-based remedies that are 
conscious of the compliance requirements of data collecting organizations whereas those 
information privacy regimes that adopt data breach notification laws tend to focus more on 
the preservation of individual protections. The development of encryption safe harbors for 
data breach notification in the US and other jurisdictions is relevant in this regard.   
The use of an encryption safe harbor has been an integral element of data breach notification 
laws because legislators use encryption to define notification parameters for organizations. 
As applied in most data breach notification laws, encrypted personal information does not 
trigger an obligation to notify because the information that has been acquired without 
authorization is secure and therefore does not pose an identity theft risk.149 In a review of 
2007 US developments, Jones identified three types of encryption safe harbors.150 Exemptions 
exempt notification based on the notion that encrypted data is secure and does not pose a 
risk.151 Rebuttable presumptions create a presumption that encrypted data is secure and 
unauthorized acquisitions do not have to be notified.152
                                                     
147 See e.g. Burdon et al, supra note 5, at 125-126 (regarding the restricted role of data breach 
notification in the EU and in Australia that focuses on industry specific sectors and restricted types of 
information respectively). 
 However, this presumption can be 
148 See e.g. Needles, supra note 73, at 303 (regarding the application of data breach notification in US 
and other jurisdictions).  
149 See Skinner, supra note 75, at 11 (stating that the California law equates privacy with security).  
150 See Jones, supra note 83, at 555. 
151 Id. at 573. 
152 Id 
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rebutted by facts to the contrary. Factor-based analysis requires breached organizations to 
demonstrate that the encryption adopted was effective before notification is exempted.153 
The use of these different types of safe harbors reveals underlying contestations that take 
place in sectoral and comprehensive regimes regarding the use of encrypted personal 
information as a means to minimize corporate compliance costs. Recent research shows that 
the use of exemptions and rebuttable presumptions are favored by the sectoral approach of 
the US whilst factor-based analysis is favored in comprehensive regimes such as the EU and 
Australia.154
At the US state legislature level, the use of encryption exemptions is directly linked to 
corporate compliance cost reduction and the development of market incentives to enhance 
corporate information security measures. For example, the controversial encryption 
exemption adopted in the California law appears to have been developed as a means of 
reducing corporate fears relating to compliance costs and to ensure that the law was 
compliant with related federal legislation and regulation.
  
155 The legislative intent of the 
California encryption exemption was thus a relatively simple solution to the complex 
balancing act of enhancing information security practices, whilst at the same time, 
minimizing compliance burdens. Similar outcomes are also evident in other states. In 
Indiana, a second data breach notification bill was introduced in 2008, following 
implementation of Indiana’s data breach notification law in 2006,156
                                                     
153 Id 
 which sought to alter the 
statute’s definition of encryption amongst other things. The provisions of the second bill 
would have had the effect of benchmarking adopted encryption processes and technologies 
to ensure they meet existing industry best practices, including the move away from 
password protection to encryption. However, the vast majority of the bill was rejected 
154 See generally Burdon et al., Encryption Safe Harbours, supra note 71.  
155 See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS, HEARING NOTE SB1386 (2002) (stating 
“In practice, this bill will create incentives for organizations seeking to simplify their legal 
requirements to encrypt their personal information data and develop privacy policies with similar 
notification procedures”).  
156 HB1197 sought additions to the existing encryption definition that would require adopted 
encryption processes to be “consistent with best practices common in the industry” including the 
security management arrangements of the encryption key. 
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following intensive lobbying by major corporations who feared an increase in compliance 
requirements.157
The development of the Massachusetts encryption exemption has also been fraught with 
contention. The Massachusetts definition of encryption is unique
  
158 and has been the subject 
to much controversy particularly relating to the use of further regulations developed by the 
Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation (OCABR). The first version of the 
OCABR regulations was released in early 2008 to voluble criticism from private sector 
organizations regarding potential compliance requirements.159 The criticism was such that a 
public hearing was held and a further senate bill (SB173) was put forward to revise the 
encryption requirements of the OCABR regulations.160 SB173 was introduced by Senate 
Chairman Morrissey who stated at the hearing that the regulations went “beyond its 
intent”161 in relation to technical requirements and other factors. Moreover, SB173 removed 
the specific requirement for a type of encryption and stated that a specified form of 
encryption was not to be applied.162
                                                     
157 See CHRIS SOGHOIAN, At&T, Microsoft Win as ID Theft Bill Eviscorated.  (2008), at 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13739_3-9870992-46.html (regarding the contentious discussions 
involved in the development of the second bill).  
 The primary reason for the removal of the specified 
158 See MASS. GEN. LAWS 93H §1 (2007). The full definition of encryption reads:  
“encryption is the transformation of data through the use of a 128-bit or higher algorithmic 
process into a form in which there is a low probability of assigning meaning without use of 
a confidential process or key, unless further defined by regulation of the department of 
consumer affairs and business regulation.”  
It is the second element of the definition, in conjunction with the 128bit requirement that has led to 
controversy. 
159 See e.g. MARK E SCHREIBER & ROBERT G YOUNG, Aggressive New Massachusetts Data Breach Law 
and Proposed Security Rules Require Company Action.  (2008), at 
http://www.eapdlaw.com/files/News/4322f87f-a398-4342-8c0b-
33c977a22c54/Presentation/NewsAttachment/eb517cbf-4b50-4d70-a250-
399e9596f7da/aggressive%20new%20massachusetts%20data%20law.pdf (regarding private sector 
concerns); AEA NEW ENGLAND COUNCIL, AeA Update: Massachusetts Data Breach Regulations. (2008), at 
http://www.aeanet.org/AeACouncils/zpUnYyihJjBdaJkdVziIPsEPkNrmnYWy.pdf (particularly in 
relation to technical issues such as the definition of encryption, the requirement to encrypt personal 
information and the requirement to encrypt information transmitted wirelessly) 
160 See e.g. ALEXANDER B HOWARD, Mass. Senate Seeks to Amend, Weaken Data Breach Notification Law.  
(2009), at 
http://searchcompliance.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid195_gci1356356,00.html# 
(regarding the claim that the Massachusetts Legislature had the power to change 93(H) but not the 
regulations). See also OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS AND BUSINESS REGULATION, Office of Consumer 
Affairs Files Revised ID Theft Regulations.  (2009), at 
http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=ocapressrelease&L=1&L0=Home&sid=Eoca&b=pressrelease&f=200
90212_idtheft&csid=Eoca (regarding the regulatory change of approach). 
161 See Senate Bill No. 173.  (2009), at 
http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/senate/186/st00pdf/st00173.pdf. 
162 Id. 
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encryption exemption was to protect small and medium size businesses as specified by 
section one of SB173.163 In February 2009, OCABR released amended regulations and the 
definition of encryption was changed.164 At present, SB173 has not been enacted but the new 
regulations have now come into force.165
At the US federal level, the two bills that have passed a vote in Congress contain rebuttable 
presumptions rather than exemptions. However, the use of rebuttable presumptions still 
indicates a desire to reduce corporate compliance obligations. Testimony heard by the 
House of Representative Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, in 
relation to the DATA 2009 bill is clear on this point. The threat of over-regulation was clearly 
articulated in line with the adoption of a risk-based approach that focused on the 
implementation of reasonable and appropriate security measures rather than specific 
technologies.
 
166 A similar point is echoed by California Senator Diane Feinstein regarding 
her efforts to introduce a number of data breach notification bills including the Notification 
of Risk to Personal Data Act of 2005. Senator Feinstein did not believe an encryption 
exemption was warranted because “[c]onsumers must have the tools they need to protect 
themselves against the risk of identity theft” 167
                                                     
163 S1(A), SB173 (stating “The department shall not in its regulations, however, require covered 
persons to use a specific technology or technologies, or a specific method or methods for protecting 
personal information”).  
 even though it was against the interests of 
164 OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS AND BUSINESS REGULATION, 201 CMR 17.00: Standards for the 
Prtoection of Personal Information of Residents of the Commonwealth. (2009), at 
http://www.mass.gov/Eoca/docs/idtheft/201CMR1700reg.pdf (“the transformation of data into a 
form in which meaning cannot be assigned without the use of a confidential process or key”). 
165 Id.  (regarding the new regulations).  
166 See TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, TRADE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE. (2009). (regarding testimony provided by Robert 
Holleyman, the president of the Business Software Alliance (BSA) and stating “The potential is high 
to turn data custody – an activity that is for most companies, whether large or small, only incidental 
to their core business – into a stifling compliance burden, with little to gain in terms of increased data 
security”). See also BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, About BSA and Members.  (2010), at 
http://www.bsa.org/country/BSA%20and%20Members.aspx (stating “BSA is the voice of the 
world's commercial software industry and its hardware partners on a wide range of business and 
policy affairs”).   
167 SENATOR DIANE  FEINSTEIN, Press Release: Senator Feinstein Calls for Passage of Legislation to Require 
Prompt Notification When Personal Information Has Been Compromised by Data Breach.  (2006), at 
http://feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecor
d_id=7929faac-7e9c-9af9-71f4-d3142e230015&Region_id=&Issue_id=5b8dc16b-7e9c-9af9-7de7-
22b24a491232.. 
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the financial sector.168
These examples highlight that the use of encryption safe harbors in US data breach 
notification laws and proposals prioritize the reduction of corporate compliance cost 
burdens by minimizing the scope of notification. The encryption safe harbor has been an 
adjunct to the primary aim of the laws, the mitigation of identity theft crimes, and has been 
developed as a counterbalance to corporate fears of the compliance implications of over-
notification that potentially conflict with the consumer protection aims of data breach 
notification laws.  
 The bill did not succeed, but Senator Feinstein clearly indicates 
corporate interests in the reduction of compliance requirements related to data breach 
notification. 
Contrast that with similar discussion within the EU where encryption safe harbors have also 
been a bone of contention but for different reasons. The Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party issued an opinion on the proposed amendments to the e-Privacy Directive and stated 
that the appropriate technological protection measures exemption should not be 
implemented.169 The Working Party feared that the enactment of an exemption would 
significantly reduce the quality and usefulness of notifications delivered to affected 
persons.170 In essence, the only way a person can take action to protect themselves is if they 
have received adequate information about the risk. The content of notification format is an 
essential component of notification and organizational decisions to notify should only be 
based on the principle of risk assessment rather than exemptions based on technical 
measures to protect personal data.171 The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 
voiced a similar concern by broadly stating that Article 4 of the amended e-Privacy Directive 
“should not contain any exception to the obligation to notify”.172
                                                     
168 SENATOR DIANE  FEINSTEIN, Press Release: Senator Feinstein Reiterates Call for Passage of Strong ID 
Theft Legislation.  (2006), at 
http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.PressReleases&Content
Record_id=792a0134-7e9c-9af9-75ef-07abbb67d740&Region_id=&Issue_id=5b8dc16b-7e9c-9af9-7de7-
22b24a491232.. 
 Instead, the issue of safe 
169 See ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 1/2009 ON THE PROPOSALS 
AMENDING DIRECTIVE 2002/58/EC ON PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS (E-PRIVACY 
DIRECTIVE) (2009). 
170 Id. at 6. 
171 Id.  
172 OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR ON THE PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE OF 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL AMENDING, AMONG OTHERS, DIRECTIVE 2002/58/EC 
CONCERNING THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA AND THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY IN THE ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR (DIRECTIVE ON PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS) (2008). 
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harbors to notification should be addressed through extensive debate relating to the issues 
at stake which would be reflected in implementing legislation.173
Significant differences exist between sectoral and comprehensive approaches regarding the 
choice of encryption safe harbors in data breach notification laws. The use of encryption safe 
harbors highlights the different prioritization between sectoral and comprehensive 
approaches regarding conflicting interests of corporate compliance and consumer 
protection.
  
174 The use encryption safe harbors again highlight the ex ante and an ex post 
purposes175 that are inherent to data breach notification. Comprehensive approaches focus 
on the ex ante purpose through the encouraged adoption of encryption and other 
technologies to protect personal information.176 The sectoral approach, on the other hand, 
focuses on the ex post aim that regards a greater importance to the minimization of 
compliance cost burdens by not requiring notification for data breaches that involve the 
unauthorized acquisition of encrypted personal information. As such, the use of encryption 
safe harbors for data breach notification purposes in comprehensive legal frameworks 
encourage the use of encryption as a means to secure personal data per se thus ensuring the 
protection of individual rights of control and access to personal information. However, 
encryption safe harbors in sectoral data breach notification laws use encryption as 
compliance cost reduction measure and a market-based incentive for encouraged adoption 
of information security procedures.177
                                                     
173 Id. at 8. 
 These are two different motivations for the use of 
encryption that reflect the expansive scope of rights-based protections of information 
privacy laws and the narrow approach of market-based initiatives found in data breach 
notification laws. These fundamental differences explain why the sectoral approach of data 
breach notification sits rather uncomfortably in comprehensive frameworks and the 
174 See e.g. Winn, supra note 75, at 29 (regarding the development of the Californian law). 
“Confronted with the complex, multi-polar institutional framework of business information 
systems, the California legislature asserted jurisdiction over only two parties and crafted a bi-
polar solution that resembles the holding of a case more than it resembles modern regulation: 
California citizens were given a right of notice of problems occurring at businesses serving 
them.” 
175 Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection: Economic 
and Legal Perspectives, supra note, 100 at 1061. 
176 See e.g. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, THE FUTURE OF PRIVACY - JOINT 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONSULTATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA. (2009); OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY 
COMMISSIONER (AUSTRL.) PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDELINES TO INFORMATION PRIVACY PRINCIPLES 4-7.  (1998). 
177 See e.g. REIDENBERG, The Globalization of Privacy Solutions, supra note 116, at 240 (regarding the 
difficulties of implementing a comprehensive privacy regimes in the US that is likely to lead “to 
difficulties balancing individual and commercial interests”). 
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comprehensive element of universal coverage generates such compliance cost-related 
concerns.  
IV.  SHARED HORIZONTAL WEAKNESSES  
Along with fundamental differences, both information privacy and data breach notification 
laws share similar weaknesses which come more clearly into focus when the conceptual 
reach of the information covered by the laws is examined. Regulatory action under both 
laws is derived under chains of accountability that seek to link providers, collectors and 
users of personal information. Moreover, both laws have an overt focus on the regulation of 
specific types of information albeit from different conceptual and contextual approaches. 
These shared weaknesses are illustrated within the context of three major data breaches.  
A. THREE ILLUSTRATIVE DATA BREACHES 
Three data breaches are examined to demonstrate that individual breaches have different 
causes and ramifications that require alternative regulatory responses. The introduction of 
Bennett and Raab’s Fallibility Matrix reveals the different causes behind the three breaches 
that involve both human and technological errors. However, both data breach notification 
and information privacy laws have restricted accountability frameworks which results in 
limited remedies.   
The first example involves the British National Party (BNP) and the leaking of their 
membership list. The BNP is a right-wing, nationalist political party based in the United 
Kingdom and membership of the party is a sensitive issue as some professions preclude 
membership of the party.178 In 2008, a disgruntled former BNP employee obtained the BNP’s 
membership list without authorization and published the 12,000 plus party membership list 
on the Internet.179
                                                     
178 See BBC NEWS, ACPO Bans Police from Joining BNP  § May 19 (2004) (regarding the Association 
of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) ban on membership of the BNP in UK police forces); CHRISTOPHER 
HOPE, How Many BNP activists Live in Your Town? Now You Can Find Out, The Times 20 November. 
2008.  
 The published details included names, addresses, telephone numbers, 
email addresses and in some cases, employment details. The list also included the names 
179 See generally ESTHER  ADDLEY & HAROON  SIDDIQUE, BNP Membership List Posted Online by Former 
'Hardliner',  November 19 2008; BBC NEWS, BNP Activists' Details Published May 19 2008; DOMINIC 
KENNEDY & NICO HINES, Thousands in Fear after BNP Members List Leak, The Times, November 19 2008; 
JAMES KIRKUP & CHRISTOPHER HOPE, BNP Membership List Leaked onto Internet, The Daily Telegraph, 
November 19 2008; BEN RUSSELL, BNP Membership List Published on Internet, The Independent, 
November 19 2008; JAMES STURCKE, et al., BNP Membership List Leaked Online, Guardian, November 18 
2008. 
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and ages of children who have become members of the party after a parent had taken out a 
family membership, and several people who have joined the party at the age of 16.180 The 
BNP subsequently admitted that the list inaccurate as it included the names of persons who 
had never been party members.181
Different organizations and individuals, used bit torrent and social networking websites,
  
182 
to copy and disseminate the membership list further. Moreover, media organizations and 
individuals used the membership list to create geo-mashups based on its content. The 
unauthorized release of the BNP membership list had some serious consequences. Some 
BNP members lost their jobs183 or received death threats184 and in one instance, a car 
belonging to the neighbor of a BNP member was mistakenly petrol bombed.185 Media 
sources reported that two persons were arrested and prosecuted with criminal offences 
under the Data Protection Act 1998, in a joint investigation with the Information 
Commissioner’s Office, regarding the publication of the list.186
The second example involves the pharmaceutical corporation Pfizer. In 2007, the spouse of a 
Pfizer employee accessed his partner’s work-related laptop by using the employee’s 
username and password.
  
187
                                                     
180 See ADDLEY & SIDDIQUE, supra note 
 After he had gained access, the spouse installed an 
unauthorized software program which enabled access to a peer-to-peer file sharing 
179. 
181 See HOPE, supra note 179 (reporting that data collected and published on the list was of a rather 
unconventional nature). 
182 See SAM LEITH, What's 'Liberal' About Hacking into the BNP?, The Times, November 22 2008 
(regarding publication of personal information from the BNP membership list on Facebook). 
183 See BBC NEWS, 'BNP Membership' Officer Sacked May 19 2009 (regarding the sacking of a 
police officer for being a member of the BNP); LONDON EVENING STANDARD, Radio Host Exposed in 
BNP Leak is Axed,  2008 (regarding the sacking of a national talk back radio presenter); BBC NEWS, 
Church Asked to Ban BNP Members, May 19 2009 (highlighting the Church of England Synod is 
considering banning clergy from joining the BNP after it was revealed that clergymen were members 
of the BNP). 
184 See BBC NEWS, BNP Members 'Targeted by Threats' May 19 2008 (regarding details of threats 
received by callers to a BBC radio programme); IAN WATSON, Privacy Issues for BNP Members.  (2008), 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7737651.stm (regarding the security of BNP 
members in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic); THE SENTINEL, Death Threats for Politician after 
BNP Members List is Leaked, May 19 2008 (regarding death threats received by a BNP local councilor); 
THIS IS CORNWALL, Death Threats as BNP Members are Named, May 19 2008 (regarding death threats to 
Cornish BNP members). 
185 See BBC NEWS, Police Probe BNP Link to Car Fire May 19 (2008); NICO HINES, BNP Member Says 
Family Safety at Risk After Car Explodes Outside Home, The Times November 21 2008. 
186 See BBC NEWS, Two Arrests over Leaked BNP List  May 19 2008; BBC NEWS, BNP List Arrest 
Pair are Bailed May 19 2008; IAN JOHNSTON, Two Held over BNP Member List Leak, The Independent 
December 6 2008.  
187 See JAIKUMAR VIJAYAN, INFOWORLD Pfizer Waited Six Weeks to Disclose Data Breach, July 7 2007. 
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network.188 The installation of the software was done without the knowledge or consent of 
the corporation and was against Pfizer’s employee policies.189 The laptop held details of 
17,000 Pfizer employees and the unauthorized software was configured in such a way that 
other members of the peer-to-peer network were able to access files containing Pfizer 
employee details.190 Pfizer was able to determine that the personal information of 15,700 
Pfizer employees had been accessed or copied by unknown members of the peer-to-peer 
network.191 Pfizer was also asked a number of critical questions by the Attorney General of 
Connecticut, Richard Blumenthal regarding Pfizer’s knowledge of the data breach and the 
delay in notification to its employees.192 Pfizer replied in depth about the circumstances of 
the breach but offered no indication as to the reason for the delay in notification.193
The final example regards one of the most important and influential data breaches, the 
ChoicePoint incident. ChoicePoint was a data collection and storage company that held 
information on USA households and persons totaling 19 billion records on US citizens.
 
194 
ChoicePoint provided access to its databases for legitimate businesses for a subscription fee. 
At the time of the breach, ChoicePoint had 50,000 subscribing companies that included 
insurance agencies, banks, landlords and private detectives.195
                                                     
188 See MARTIN H BOSWORTH, Pfizer Keeps Data Breach Quiet.  (2007), at 
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2007/07/pfizer_data.html. 
 In February 2005, criminals 
posing as a small business applied to ChoicePoint for subscription to their information 
services. Once the criminals subscribed to ChoicePoint’s information services they were 
allowed to acquire the personal information of 163,000 persons including date of birth, social 
security numbers and credit reports to be used for identity theft crimes.  
189 See PFIZER, FAQs Related to Pfizer Data Breach: Introduction.  (2007), at 
http://www.pfizer.com/contact/pfizer_data_breach_introduction.jsp. 
190 See VIJAYAN, supra note 187; JOHN LEYDEN, Pfizer Worker Data Leaked via P2P. (2007), at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/06/14/pfizer_p2p_data_leak/. 
191 VIJAYAN, supra note 187.  
192 RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Letter to Pfizer re Security Breach.  (2007), at 
http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/consumers/pfizerdatabreachletter.pdf.. 
193 VIJAYAN, Pfizer Waited Six Weeks to Disclose Data Breach.. 
194 See ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, Choicepoint.  (2008), at 
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/ (regarding the role of ChoicePoint as a data broker); Garcia, 
supra note 81, at 716 (stating that ChoicePoint collected personal information of consumers, 
“including names, social security numbers, dates of birth, bank and credit card account numbers, and 
credit histories, much of which is sensitive and not publicly available”). 
195 See e.g. Derek A Bishop, To Serve and Protect: Do Businesses Have a Legal Duty to Protect Collections 
of Personal Information?, 3 SHIDLER J. L. COMM. & TECH., (2006) (regarding class actions against 
ChoicePoint); see also MARTIN G BINGISSER, Data Privacy and Breach Reporting: Compliance with Varying 
State Laws, 4 SHIDLER J. L. COMM. & TECH., (2008) (regarding the actions of state attorney general’s). 
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The application forms necessary to access ChoicePoint’s data were completed using false 
information which the company failed to realize because it had not implemented procedures 
that confirmed and authorized the identities of potential subscribers.196 ChoicePoint later 
admitted that 50 business clients to whom it was selling data were fraudulent entities.197 
ChoicePoint simply did not have processes in place to identify and monitor unlawful users 
despite the fact that they had been previously notified by law enforcement authorities of 
fraudulent activities arising from some of their subscribers.198 ChoicePoint notified 
consumers of the incident pursuant to the California law and were subsequently charged 
with offences relating to the failure to provide adequate security and for making false and 
misleading statements about its privacy policy.199 In total, eight hundred incidents of 
identity theft have been attributed to the ChoicePoint data breach.200 ChoicePoint agreed to 
pay $US10 million in civil penalties and $US5 million in consumer redress to reimburse 
consumers for expenses due to identity theft.201
B. ONE SIZE FITS ALL CHAINS OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
  
The author contends that both laws have a shared weakness because they are predicated on 
process-based chains of accountability that seek to provide legislative remedies within the 
bounds of designated roles involving providers, collectors and re-users of personal 
information. However, limitations emerge due to the simplistic nature of these chains, which 
no longer account for the complexities of personal information exchange and because 
remedial responses treat different concerns within the same constrained rubric of the 
accountability framework. The limits of both laws are illustrated when the three data 
breaches highlighted are examined in greater depth using Bennett and Raab’s fallibility 
matrix202
                                                     
196 See P. N. Otto, et al., The ChoicePoint Dilemma: How Data Brokers Should Handle the Privacy of 
Personal Information, 5 IEEE Security & Privacy, 15, 18. (2007) (providing a detailed and critical 
overview of the incident). 
 which underscores that different types of privacy problems are essentially 
addressed in the same manner by both laws.  
197 See Garcia, supra note 81, at 716. 
198 United States of America v ChoicePoint Inc. (2006), pp. 13. 
199 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges; to Pay $10 Million 
in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress.  (2006), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.htm. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. (outlining details of the settlement). See also Garcia, supra note 81, at 716. 
202 BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 25 (regarding the conceptual basis 
of the matrix). 
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Bennett and Raab developed a simple four cell matrix to examine the source of privacy 
problems that arise through human and technological fallibilities and infallibilities.203 The 
authors use the matrix to demonstrate that different types of privacy problems can occur 
within different cells. For example, Cell I contains most privacy problems as they involve 
both human and technological fallibilities such as the excessive collection of personal 
information.204 Cell II details a different type of situation, namely, where there are no 
technological or structural problems and the privacy problem occurs due solely to the 
“workings of human agency.”205 Cell III covers opposite situations to Cell II where a 
technological or structural issue, rather than a case of human error, gives rise to privacy 
problems, such as a deficient data processing system or a malicious hacking attack.206 
Finally, Cell IV refers to situations in which both human agents and technological structures 
perform adequately but this level of performance creates surveillance-related concerns.207
Bennett and Raab also contend that each fallibility axis is a continuum and thus the 
positioning of privacy problems can be related to any part of each cell.
 
The latter cell is of less concern to this article as the focus on data breaches naturally requires 
an examination of personal information leakage. However, the remaining three cells are 
instructive because they highlight that data breaches and therefore information privacy 
problems arise in different contexts, as outlined in figure 2 below. 
208 However, in 
practice, it is likely that most positions will be found nearer the meeting point of the axes 
rather than the corners of each cell because “few human agents, and few technical systems, 
are either perfect or imperfect.”209
                                                     
203 Id. 
 The tree example breaches show that even though each 
breach can be separated into different cells they nonetheless share overlapping features that 
make each breach relatively similar. For example, it could be argued that all data breaches 
involved issues of ineffective security which would tend to suggest a technological or 
structural failing. It is not surprising to find that each breach locates towards the centre of 
the matrix rather than periphery. Nevertheless, each data breach highlights that information 
privacy problems originate in different ways.  
204 Id. at 26. 
205 Id. at 26-27 (citing examples such as “wrong inferences or conclusions from outputs of data 
produced by the system, whether because of inadequate training, the biases inherent in the pursuit of 
certain organizational goals, the pressures of reward systems in the organization”). 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 26. 
209 Id.  
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   Figure 2 – Application of Illustrative Data Breaches to Bennett and Raab’s Fallibility Matrix 
 
The BNP data breach can be located in Cell I because it entails both technological and 
human failings. First, human infallibilities arose because unnecessary and inaccurate 
personal information was collected from BNP members and even non-BNP members. 
Second, technological and structural fallibilities occurred because the disgruntled employee 
was able to easily acquire and copy the complete membership list without authorization and 
remove it from the confines of the BNP’s organizational structure. The Pfizer data breach, on 
the other hand, gives rise to a different problem which locates it in Cell II of Bennett and 
Raab’s matrix. The initial data breach arose because the employee’s spouse installed 
unauthorized software which enabled unknown third parties to access and acquire 
employee personal information without authorization. Accordingly, there was no 
technological or structural fallibility and the problem solely originated from the actions of 
the employee’s spouse who was able to bypass technological protections. The ChoicePoint 
data breach is an example of a Cell III type privacy concern as it originated from a problem 
of structural and technological rather than human fallibility. In this case, it was 
ChoicePoint’s procedures which were at fault. In fact, if ChoicePoint had completed a 
background check on the criminals, based on its own records, it would have found a link 
between one of the applicants and previous frauds involving social security numbers.210
                                                     
210 See United States of America v ChoicePoint Inc. (2006), pp. 13. 
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The application of Bennett and Raab’s matrix to these three data breaches is helpful because 
it demonstrates that data breaches, as information privacy problems, emerge in different 
ways and contain different contexts. For example, only one of the breaches, the ChoicePoint 
incident, is directly related to identity theft issues. The BNP data breach, whilst not giving 
rise to identity theft issues, clearly gave rise to different forms of harm such as the petrol 
bombing attack that took place. The Pfizer data breach did not materialize any actual 
identity theft or other related harms but certainly had the potential to do so.211
The BNP data breach occured because of the disgruntled employee’s initial unauthorized 
acquisition but the real ‘privacy problem’ was the subsequent re-use of the membership list 
and its publication on the internet by third parties ulterior to the breach. The Pfizer breach, 
like the BNP breach, demonstrates a layered, emergent problem. The installation of the peer-
to-peer software by the employee’s spouse gave rise to the initial privacy concern. However, 
it is the second unauthorized acquisition  by third parties unknown to the breached 
organization that gave rise to the actual problem. . The ChoicePoint data breach is somewhat 
different in character to the BNP and the Pfizer data breaches because there is less of an 
emergent problem involving stages of unauthorized access. There was not an initial 
unauthorized act that gave rise to a series of subsequent and more serious unauthorized 
acts. Instead, the data breach was mistakenly authorized by ChoicePoint due to the failings 
of its own security systems. As such, only one act of unauthorized acquisition took place 
which involved a different type of ulterior third party, identity theft criminals. 
 However, 
whilst the three data breaches have different contexts all of them involve the insertion of 
outside third parties that are integral to the emergent privacy problems.  
These three incidents show that data breaches involve different types of privacy problems. 
However, both information privacy and data breach notification laws deal with those 
problems in a ‘one-size fits all’ fashion founded upon narrow chains of accountability and 
one-dimensional remedies that provide limited help or real redress. For example, previous 
work has highlighted the limits of information privacy law in dealing with the BNP data 
breach.212
                                                     
211 See, e.g., BLUMENTHAL, supra note, 194) (regarding proposed actions for Pfizer to take to mitigate 
the possibilities of identity theft). 
 The analysis of this data breach within the rubric of investigating privacy invasive 
geo-mashups highlighted the limits of information privacy law. The principle reason being 
is that information privacy law is predicated on predictable, binary chains of accountability 
212 Burdon, First Generation Laws, supra note 17, at 35-38 (regarding the ineffectiveness of privacy 
protections in relation to publication on the internet). 
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between personal information providers, collectors and re-users. However, in this incident 
the binary relationship between the data provider and the data re-users (Wikileaks and the 
geo-mashup creators) does not materialize and thus there is no form of redress available 
against these parties for individual BNP members whose personal information has 
nonetheless been disclosed by them.  
A similar concern arises with the Pfizer data breach in which there is no relationship at all 
between the provider of personal information (Pfizer’s employees) and the subsequent re-
users (the peer-to-peer members) other than a tangential link via the errant spouse. 
However, it is clear that these re-users can give rise to serious potential threats even though 
there is no direct relationship. Information privacy law seems to operate more effectively 
with the ChoicePoint data breach because this type of breach more readily accords with the 
imposition of security protections for personal information within a readily identifiable and 
largely institutionalized focus.213 It is clearly arguable that ChoicePoint failed to implement 
adequate security measures in relation to the storage of personal information which is a key 
element of most information privacy laws.214
Accordingly, the application of information privacy laws makes it difficult to cope with the 
insertion of most third parties into the contextual mix of privacy problems even though the 
transition from binary to multiple information relationships is now an everyday part of life 
in the information society.
 The outside third party in that breach is 
therefore considered in information privacy laws as being a reasonable eventuality unlike 
the third parties in the other two data breaches.   
215 Information privacy laws overtly focus on the process of 
personal information exchange rather than the relationships or social contexts involved in 
that process.216
                                                     
213 BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 
 The law’s focus on process has the benefit of providing a manageable and 
implementable set of fair information principles that can readily translate to a regulatory 
mechanism but it relegates the protection of privacy to limited circumstances and thus 
greatly reduces the potential scope for legal redress or remedial action. The inherently 
20, at 35 (stating that fundamental 
classifications under information privacy law are predicated on an institutionalized basis). 
214 See e.g. BYGRAVE, supra note 57, at 67 (regarding the role of information security as a key 
principle of information privacy laws). 
215 Burdon, First Generation Laws, supra note 17, at 36. 
216 See e.g. BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 35 (stating that after 30 
years of information privacy law there is still very little known about the needs or requirements of 
‘data subjects’). 
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reductionist scope of information privacy law217 has created the situation in which even 
legislative rights granted through the law are nonetheless limited because they are based on 
mechanistic processes of personal information exchange.218
Data breach notification laws, on the other hand, have been developed to tackle a specific 
substantive issue regarding the mitigation of identity theft risks arising from specified 
misuses of personal information. In effect, they are less concerned about the process of 
information exchange and pay lesser heed to regulating the activities of personal 
information collectors and re-users by giving personal information providers a set of limited 
rights. Accordingly, data breach notification laws do not suffer from the same sort of 
difficulties pertaining to chains of accountability due to their limited focus. If an 
organization loses control over an individual’s personal information, then they have to 
notify that individual.
  
219 If a chain of accountability exists, it is a rudimentary one between 
an organization and an individual regarding the notification of unauthorized acquisition of 
personal information. However, they do share the same weakness as information privacy 
laws because they provide a one size fits all remedy.220
The three data breaches illustrated in this section emit different types of problems, 
demonstrate different types of causes and involve different types of parties who have 
different motives. Despite these differences, the only remedial response available is 
notification of the incident. Schwartz and Janger have highlighted a number of criticisms of 
this remedial aspect of data breach notification laws.
 
221
                                                     
217 See David Lindsay, An Exploration of the Conceptual Basis of Privacy and the Implications for the 
Future of Australian Privacy Law, 29 MELB. UNIV. L. REV. 131, 165 (2005) (regarding the role of excessive 
rationalization to minimize the scope of information privacy law). 
 Notification letters are problematic 
due to the context in which they are used. For example, ChoicePoint’s notification letters 
attempted to minimize the extent of the breach and were concerned with damage control to 
the company rather than the provision of accurate and meaningful information to 
218 BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 147 (stating “[information privacy] 
laws have typically provided procedural rules and devices without greatly tackling many substantive 
issues concerning the processing of personal data in contemporary society”). 
219 See e.g. St. Amant, supra note 80, at 511 (stating that the Californian law does not require an 
actual breach or an identity theft element to oblige notification).  
220 See e.g. Bill Lane, et al., Stakeholder Perspectives Regarding the Mandatory Notification of Australian 
Data Breaches, 15 M.A.L.R 149, 164 (2010) (presenting findings of Australian research that questions 
the effectiveness of remedies provided by data breach notification laws). 
221 Schwartz & Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches supra note 84 at 951-953 (regarding the 
problems that arise from notification letters).  
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individuals.222 ChoicePoint was also signaled out for significant criticism as their notification 
letter attempted to sell the company’s credit reference products to those persons who were 
being notified.223 Notification fatigue may also be a prominent concern as individuals appear 
to treat notification letters as another form of marketing material and do not read them.224
A greater focus is needed on the context of each individual breach and the remedies 
appropriate for that breach. For example, in the BNP breach,
 
Notification may therefore provide a limited remedy.  
225 it is questionable whether 
notification of the breach would have made any difference given the public nature of the 
membership lists re-publication. Instead, removal of the published information was required 
although this would have been practically very difficult given the extent the list was copied 
and re-used. Accordingly, as Schwartz and Janger highlight, a more emphasized focus on 
co-ordinated responses to data breaches is required that goes beyond simple and blunt 
notification strategies.226
C. INFORMATION BASED FOCUS & LIMITED HARMS 
 However, to do so would require a deeper contextual analysis that 
is conducted on a case-by-case basis. This contextual analysis may be difficult to implement 
from a regulatory perspective given the limited role that data breach notification is intended 
to fulfill because both data breach notification and information privacy laws have an overt 
focus on the regulation of information which manifests in the mitigation of limited social 
harms. 
Both data breach notification laws and information privacy laws are designed to regulate 
certain types of information. However, there are differences with regard to the inclusion or 
exclusion of context based approaches. Information privacy has a wider outlook that 
generally builds on context dependency and is flexible about what information will be 
regulated.227
                                                     
222 Id.at 952. 
 However, whilst data breach notification laws also regulate certain types of 
information they do so from a context independent approach that seeks to negate the 
223 Id. at 953. 
224 See PONEMON INSTITUTE, NATIONAL SURVEY ON DATA SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION (2005) 
(regarding a survey of individuals who received notification letters and their subsequent response to 
those letters).  
225 It is of course acknowledged that the breach was not required to be notified under UK law. 
226  Schwartz & Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches supra note 84, at 960. 
227 See e.g. PRINS, supra note 39, at  247-249 (regarding the difficulties in assigning what is personal 
information under data protection laws within the broad rubric of economic notions of privacy as 
property). 
 41 
application of context-based analysis.228
Information privacy laws cover personally identifiable information that is generally 
classified as “personal data”
 The reason that both laws use different types of 
information based regulation mechanisms is due to their different purposes as highlighted 
above. Data breach notification laws regulate a specific type of information to mitigate a 
specific problem whereas information privacy laws regulate a wider type of information for 
a potentially wider purpose. As such, both laws regulate specified types of information to 
preclude certain harms but the harms that they seek to preclude are relatively limited as 
demonstrated below.  
229 or “personal information.”230 The broad purpose of 
information privacy laws is reflected in how personal information is classified. A key 
component of information privacy law is that personal information will be construed 
expansively231 and thus the classification of personal information is potentially a complex 
task. The complexity generates from the tacit acceptance of the need for context dependent 
approaches in classifying personal information that go beyond the information itself and 
require an examination of the social context of information generation.232 For example, the 
definition of personal information in the Australian Privacy Act has two distinct elements.233 
The first element states that personal information is information that makes an identity 
apparent and the second element is information from which an identity reasonably 
ascertainable.234
                                                     
228 See Needles, supra note 15, at 281 (regarding the purpose of data breach notification as “the loss 
of control over a particular type of data which can cause a “measurable economic harm” in the form 
of identity theft). 
 The first element is a context independent approach because there is no 
recourse to the context of information generation because the information itself is enough to 
enable identity. However, the second element offers a different approach. It allows for the 
229 Council Directive 95/46, Art. 2(a). 
230 S6(1) PRIVACY ACT 1988 (Cth) (Austrl.) 
231 See e.g. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 4/2007 ON THE CONCEPT OF 
PERSONAL DATA. (2007) (confirming that a “wide notion” of personal data is to be applied). 
232 See e.g. BOOTH, supra note 136 (providing models of how data protection authorities 
conceptualize personal information both from a context independent and dependent approach); 
Burdon & Telford, Conceptual Basis, supra note 136 (applying the models put forward by the Booth 
Report to Australian legislation); WACKS, supra note 24, at 20 (regarding the normative and 
descriptive role of personal information). 
233 S6(1) PRIVACY ACT 1988 (Cth) (Austrl.)  
“personal information means information or an opinion (including information or an opinion 
forming part of a database), whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material form or 
not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the 
information or opinion.” 
234 See Burdon & Telford, Conceptual Basis, supra note 136, at 12 (describing both elements within 
the context of Australian privacy law). 
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situation in which information can be combined with other information to enable identity. 
Accordingly, the second element relies heavily on social context and this is seen as an 
integral element of Australian privacy law.235
The issue of harm negation is a key element in the use of context dependent approaches to 
the classification of personal information. Harm in the eyes of the Australian law is the 
revealment of identity.
 
236 Accordingly, the law takes an open approach to what constitutes 
personal information because the harm and the use of such information are directly linked. 
However, it is acknowledged that not all information privacy laws have an identity-related 
focus and some laws require a type of privacy-related harm, above and beyond, the 
revealment of identity.237
Data breach notification laws attempt to mitigate the specific harm of identity theft and they 
do so by regulating specified forms of personal information in combination with other 
information. For example, although the California law requires notification upon the 
unauthorized acquisition of personal information, the definition of personal information is 
different to those found in most comprehensive information privacy laws because it seeks to 
negate a context dependent analysis.  As such, personal information under the California 
law is  
 
[A]n individual's first name or first initial and last name in combination with 
any one or more of the following data elements, when either the name or the 
data elements are not encrypted: (1) Social security number. (2) Driver's 
license number or California Identification Card number. (3) Account 
number, credit or debit card number, in combination with any required 
security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an 
individual's financial account.238
The California law is therefore solely concerned with combinations of personal information 
that can be used to give rise to identity theft harms. Some US state-based laws have 
 
                                                     
235 See KAREN CURTIS, Speech to the Australian Corporate Lawyers Association on Privacy and 'Walking 
the Line', Canberra, 29 February 2009.  (2009), at 
http://www.privacy.gov.au/materials/types/download/9473/7038 (“This idea of what can be 
‘reasonably ascertained’ is significant. Clearly, whether an individual’s identity can be ascertained 
depends on the context in which the information is held”). 
236 See Burdon & Telford, Conceptual Basis, supra note 136, at 17-20 (regarding a review of 
Australian legislation and confirming the centrality of identity revealment in Australian privacy law).  
237 See e.g.  BOOTH, supra note 136, at 95-102 (regarding different conceptualizations of harm). 
238 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(e). See also Bingisser, supra note 195 (regarding an overview of 
differences). 
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attempted to expand definitions to include other identifying information, for example, 
biometric information,239 passport number240 and account passwords or other access 
codes.241 The North Carolina law has one of the most expansive definitions relating to 
“identifying information” that also includes digital signatures, parents’ former legal 
surname242 and email addresses, amongst others.243 The Texas law recognizes both 
“personally identifying information”244 and “sensitive personal information.”245 The former 
can be information that does not require cross-referencing with other information to trigger 
notification of a data breach whereas the latter requires the combination of personal 
information and other identifying details. Likewise, the New York law incorporates both 
“personal information”246 and “private information”247 and the latter is the type of 
information normally covered by data breach notification laws. The purpose of the different 
definitions in the New York law is to clearly identify what will be constituted as personal 
information for combination with private information to create a specified sub-set of 
regulable information. As such, all of these laws specify the types of information or 
combinations of information that when breached could give rise to an obligation to notify. 
What constitutes personal information within the rubric of data breach notification is 
therefore deliberately constrained.248
Data breach notification proposals that have been put forward in comprehensive 
information privacy laws also have a context independent approach as to what information 
  
                                                     
239 See e.g. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-801 (2006) (5)(e); MD. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3501 (2008). 
240 See e.g. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1704 (2006) (5)(B)(4); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.600 (2007).   
241 See e.g. ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (Michie 2009); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3851 (2007); GA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-911 (2005); IOWA CODE § 715C.1 (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-60 (2005); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. 10, §§ 210-B-1346 (West 2007); 9 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 2430 (2007). 
242 See also N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-30-01 (2005).  
243 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-60 (2005). 
244 TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE. §§ 48.001 (2005) (1). 
245  TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE. §§ 48.001 (2005) (2). 
246  N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAWS §§ 899-aa (2005) §1(a). 
"Personal information" shall mean any information concerning a natural person which, because 
of name, number, personal mark, or other identifier, can be used to identify such natural person”. 
247 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAWS §§ 899-aa (2005) §1(b) 
 "Private information" shall mean personal information consisting of any information in 
combination with any one or more of the following data elements, when either the personal 
information or the data element is not encrypted, or encrypted with an encryption key that has also 
been acquired: (1) social security number; (2) driver's license number or non-driver identification card 
number; or (3) account number, credit or debit card number, in combination with any required 
security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an individual's financial account; 
"Private information" does not include publicly available information which is lawfully made 
available to the general public from federal, state, or local government records.. 
248 See St. Amant, supra note 80, at 526 (criticizing this approach and calling for flexible definitions 
of personal information similar to comprehensive information privacy legal regimes). 
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will trigger notification. For example, the data breach notification proposal put forward by 
the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) uses a new form of information called 
“specified personal information” that is designed to substantially limit the broad ranging 
definition of personal information in the Privacy Act for data breach notification purposes. 
Specified personal information “prescribes combinations of information that would “when 
acquired without authorization, give rise to a real risk of serious harm requiring 
notification.”249 According to the ALRC, such information is likely to include an individual’s 
name and address in combination with other identifying information that could enable a 
person to commit an “account takeover” or “true name fraud.”250
The EU has taken a different approach in the e-Privacy Directive.
 The ALRC’s approach to 
information that could oblige notification is similar to that of US state-based data breach 
notification laws as it is founded upon a context independent approach to classifying 
personal information. 
251 The e-Privacy Directive 
differs substantially from the purpose of US data breach notification laws as it has a much 
wider ambit about the type of situations and the sort of information that will trigger 
notification of a data breach.252 However, it is limited in the sense as it only covers data 
breach incidents in the telecommunications sector.253 The e-Privacy Directive simply states 
that notification is required where there is a breach of network security that lies beyond the 
provider to remedy.254
                                                     
249 AUSTRALIAN LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 
 The e-Privacy Directive is potentially more expansive than its US 
data breach legislative counterparts because it does not require a specified type of 
information to trigger notification. The European Commission has recently addressed this 
point by putting forward a new version of the e-Privacy Directive which amends the 
6, at 1693. 
250 Id. at 1694. 
251 DIRECTIVE 2002/58/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 12 JULY 2002 
CONCERNING THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA AND THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY IN THE ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR (DIRECTIVE ON PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS) [hereafter “E-
PRIVACY DIRECTIVE”].. 
252 See e.g. Preston and Turner, supra note 63, at 463-464 (commenting on the “organic 
development” of EU privacy legislation and the application of general data protection rules to the 
telecommunications sector in the e-Privacy Directive). 
253 Id. 
254 Art. 20, E-PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 
Service providers should take appropriate measures to safeguard the security of their services, if 
necessary in conjunction with the provider of the network, and inform subscribers of any special risks 
of a breach of the security of the network. 
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existing security breach notification requirements.255 A provider of a publicly available 
electronic communications services will now have to notify a competent national authority 
about a personal data breach.256
“[a] breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, 
alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, 
stored or otherwise processed in connection with the provision of a publicly 
available electronic communications service in the Community.”
 The definition of a “personal data breach is 
257
The e-Privacy Directive now focuses mandatory data breach notification on situations that 
(a) relate to personal data (b) involve specified unauthorized uses of personal data and (c) 
personal data is stored or processed in connection with a publicly available electronic 
communications service.
  
258 Nevertheless, the definition of a personal data breach is still 
reliant upon the definition of personal data in the Data Protection Directive.259 The EU 
consequently differs from both the US and the Australian approaches to data breach 
notification because it does not include a specifically modified definition of personal data (or 
information) for the purposes of data breach notification. Moreover, the definition of 
personal data under Article 2(a) is to be construed expansively rather than prohibitively and 
therefore has a fundamentally context dependent element.260
A context independent approach can have some benefits because it is possible to predict 
what information will constitute personal information as it is pre-defined by regulatory 
authorities.
 
261
                                                     
255 PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL AMENDING 
DIRECTIVES 2002/22/EC ON UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND USERS' RIGHTS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS AND SERVICES AND 2002/58/EC CONCERNING THE PROCESSING OF 
PERSONAL DATA AND THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY IN THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR AND 
REGULATION (EC) NO 2006/2004 ON CONSUMER PROTECTION COOPERATION (2007/0248 COD) PE-CONS 
3674/09 (ADOPTED AT THE GAERC COUNCIL OF 26/10/2009) [hereafter ‘UPDATED E-PRIVACY 
DIRECTIVE’]. 
 However, an overt focus on types of information to stimulate regulatory 
activity can produce anomalies because it forsakes a contextual analysis of information 
256 UPDATED E-PRIVACY DIRECTIVE, Art 4(3). 
257 UPDATED E-PRIVACY DIRECTIVE, Art 2(4)(c). 
258 See e.g. Burdon, et al., Mandatory Notification of Data Breaches, supra note 5, at 127 (regarding the 
potentially problematic application of data breach notification in the Directive). 
259 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 95/46, Art 2(a)  
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference 
to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity.” 
260 See e.g. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 4/2007, supra note 231. 
261 See e.g.  BOOTH, supra note 136, at 12 (regarding an advantage of context independent 
approaches that can all for specified types of data “that are always or never personal data”). 
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generation. For example, some data breaches would not be covered even though they could 
have significant ramifications. This point is demonstrated by the BNP data breach.262
In the BNP data breach, the type of personal information breached did not entail personal  
information that would necessarily enable identity theft, such as a credit card or bank 
account number. Thus, under US state-based laws, there would not be a legal requirement to 
notify because the BNP breached data would not meet the determinant threshold required 
for publication, namely, that the breached data gives rise to a risk of identity theft. The same 
is probably so with regard to the ALRC’s proposal because under the letter of proposed 
amendments, the breached data would probably not enable either account takeover or true 
name fraud. Moreover, and somewhat perversely, under Australian information privacy 
law, the Internet is construed as a generally available document and the Privacy Act would 
not have applied because personal information published would be construed as a generally 
available record and thus is exempt from the Act.
 There 
is little doubt that the BNP data breach should meet most of the requirements for 
notification under a data breach notification law as there was an unauthorized acquisition of 
personal information and there were clearly harms and risks arising from the breach. 
However, under most data breach notification laws, the breached organization would not 
have notify an individual about the breach because the type of information that was 
breached would not necessarily trigger a notification requirement.  
263
The BNP example shows the limits of an overt focus on the types of personal information 
that is predicated on a context independent approach which seeks to minimize the 
complexities of social context as part of the fulfillment of legislative obligations. Data breach 
 
                                                     
262 See e.g. Burdon, First Generation Laws, supra note 17, at 136 (briefly addressing the ramifications 
of the breach from the perspective of data breach notification law). 
263 See AUSTRALIAN LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 6, at 462. The ALRC examined whether personal 
information held within a generally available publication should be regulated under the Privacy Act. 
Currently, the Act only covers personal information held in records and a generally available 
publication, such as most public registers or telephone address books, are classed as a record so they 
are not covered within the auspices of the Act. As regards publication of personal information on the 
Internet, the determining factor to decide whether a publication is generally available online is 
“whether access to that publication [e.g. a website] can be obtained by public.” As such, a website that 
has encryption and password protections is not considered generally available and therefore may be 
subject to the Privacy Act, whereas a website without such protections is not subject to the Act 
because it is a publication that can generally be obtained by the public. The ALRC contended that it 
was not appropriate to enforce greater restrictions of the use of personal information on the Internet 
by tightening regulation of personal information held in ‘generally available publications’, e.g. 
websites. However, the ALRC stated that both organizations and agencies should be encouraged to 
put restrictions on the publication of personal information in electronic form. 
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notification laws, regardless of whether sectoral or comprehensive based, have such a 
limited view of what constitutes harm that they preclude a range of data breaches, like the 
BNP data breach, even though material harms and risks arose to those persons whose 
information had been accessed without authorization. This highlights the weaknesses of 
analysis that is focused predominantly on information and the process of information 
exchange and not the context of which the information is used.264 Even the e-Privacy 
Directive which has a more expansive, context dependent approach to the classification of 
personal information would encounter problems with this data breach. Not because of the 
type of information covered but due to the fact that the Directive only covers organizations 
in the telecommunications sector265
Potential weaknesses of data breach notification law that is founded on a sectoral approach 
can still exist when implemented within comprehensive frameworks. The effect of a purely 
context independent approach is to minimize the scope of data breach notification either by 
developing restrictive forms of personal information or by reducing the scope of coverage to 
particular sectors. However, this minimization can reduce the effective potential of data 
breach notification because it provides bounding limits to the obligation to notify. The 
definition of personal information in the Australian Privacy Act
 and would therefore have not applied to the BNP.  
266
V. INTRODUCING CONTEXTUALIZATION 
 demonstrates that a 
context independent and dependent approach can work together but that does not mean 
that the former can be imposed upon the latter without any significant consequences. Data 
breach notification can work in comprehensive information privacy frameworks but it will 
produce anomalies if it is implemented from a context independent perspective. The 
complex issue of contextualization is thus fundamental to the effectiveness of regulatory 
remedies in relation to data breaches. 
The above analysis highlights concerns relating to the underlying approaches of both laws 
that seek to minimize the role of social context. Consequently, the legislative requirements of 
both laws focus upon restricted notions of harms, confined types of regulable information 
and one size fits all conceptions of how problems emerge and how they are to be remedied. 
                                                     
264  See e.g. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 34, at 1110 (“The theory's focus on 
information, however, makes it too narrow a conception, for it excludes those aspects of privacy that 
are not informational”) 
265 See supra note 255. 
266 S6(1) PRIVACY ACT 1988 (Cth) (Austrl.) 
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However, the inclusion of a wider contextual analysis into the application of both laws 
produces a different perspective. First, it highlights that information privacy law needs to 
pay greater heed to issues of privacy rather than issues of personal information 
management. Second, it highlights that data breach notification law should be considered as 
part of a wider concern that relates to the societal use of critical information infrastructures 
that entail the protection of personal information.  
A. THE CONTEXTUAL ELEMENT 
The social context of information generation and provision is a latent but ever-present 
component of information privacy that is directly or indirectly recognized by different 
laws.267 For example, Bennett and Raab contend that the content and provision of a privacy 
right is inherently dependent on the context of social application and is thus applied 
subjectively by individuals to their own circumstances.268 Allen offers a different view of 
information privacy and social context that is intimately bound with the creation, 
development and maintenance of social relationships.269 Privacy is “down time” that 
provides the space for reflection and thus allows individuals to prepare themselves for their 
wider social responsibilities within the context of their own lives.270 Schoeman also outlines 
that the wider concept of privacy is part of a “historically conditioned, intricate normative 
matrix with interdependent practices” and is best understood when viewed contextually.271 
Privacy as a social practice thus shapes individual behavior in conjunction with other social 
practices and it is “central to social life.”272 Likewise, Moor and Tavani also acknowledge the 
importance of “situations” in deciding when and individual has a condition that is 
equivalent to privacy.273
                                                     
267 As highlighted above, a context dependent approach to the identification of personal 
information is a key element of some information privacy laws and it extends into other key 
components of information privacy law. 
 However, the notion of a situation is characterized as “deliberately 
268 See e.g. BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 9 (“But for the most part, 
the content of privacy rights and interests have to be defined by individuals themselves according to 
context”); 
269 ANITA L. ALLEN, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723 (1999). 
270 Id at 731(The value of privacy therefore lies in “the context in which individuals work to make 
themselves better equipped for their familial, professional, and political roles.”);  
271 See FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM, 137 (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY 
PRESS. 1992) (regarding the role of privacy in the balancing of social freedoms and an individual’s 
need to be part of a “human context.”) . 
272 Id.   
273 Moor, supra note 35, at 30 (stating privacy is normatively prevalent if an individual or group is 
protected from intrusion, interference and access by others).  
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indeterminate or unspecified” so that it can be construed in a number of different ways in 
circumstances that would normally be regarded as private.274
One of the most recent and perhaps fullest accounts of the importance of context in the 
regulation of information privacy is Nissenbaum’s Privacy in Context
 
275 which outlines and 
expands the theory of Contextual Integrity.276 Nissenbaum puts forward an analytical 
framework to examine potential privacy concerns arising from the introduction of new 
technologies or technological structures principally involving the use of personal 
information.277 Privacy is sufficiently important to the continued existence of social and 
political life that it cannot be compartmentalized and reduced in social importance.278 
Instead, contextual integrity represents privacy as a “delicate web of constraints”279 relating 
to flows of personal information that balances the multiple political and social spheres of 
human life. An attack on individual privacy is therefore an attack at the “very fabric of social 
and political life.”280 Privacy in this regard is not a claim regarding an individual’s control of 
their personal information but rather entails a right to appropriate flow of personal 
information which is systematically grounded in the characteristics of social situations.281
Contextual Integrity is therefore based on social context and gains expression through its 
primary concept, context-relative informational norms. These norms govern entrenched 
expectations that govern flows of personal information in everyday life. Accordingly, a 
breach of privacy under the theory of Contextual Integrity equates to a violation of an 
established informational norm.
  
282 These norms are characterized by the following four key 
parameters.283 Contexts provide a backdrop for norm development and feature an array of 
components284 that abstractly represent the experienced social structures of everyday life.285
                                                     
274 See Tavani, supra note 
 
Actors are those participants involved in direct context of information exchange: senders and 
18, at 10 (explaining the role of Moor and Tavani’s Restricted 
Access/Limited Control (RALC) theory). 
275 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL 
LIFE (Stanford Law Books. 2010) [hereafter "PRIVACY IN CONTEXT"]. 
276 HELEN NISSENBAUM, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, (2004). 
277 NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 275, at 6-7. 
278 Id. at 128. 
279 Id. 
280 Id.  
281 Id. at 129. 
282 Id. at 140. 
283 Id.  
284 These are canonical “activities, roles, power structures, norms (or rules) and internal values 
(goals, ends, purposes).” 
285 Id. at 134. 
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receivers of information and information subjects.286 However, the types of relationship that 
each party has with each other is not fixed and is acknowledged that both individuals and 
organizational representatives can have different capacities in different situational 
circumstances.287 Attributes refer to the type or nature of the information in question.288 For 
example, the same type of information can have different meaning or application in different 
contexts.289 Finally, transmission principles provide a constraint on the flow of information 
from party to party in a given context by stipulating terms and conditions which govern the 
transfer of personal information.290
These parameters are embedded within informational norms which in turn are embedded 
within different social contexts.
 
291 As such, different parameters come to the fore in different 
social contexts and in the guise of different privacy-related problems. For example, in a 
context of information exchange amongst friends, there is expected transmission principles, 
namely that the personal information exchange is usually volunteered freely and there are 
certain trust-based expectations about how that information will or will not be used. 
However, the medium of exchange can impact upon friend-based transmission principles 
especially in situations involving a broader and thus less controlled transmission of personal 
information.292 Likewise, the provision of the exact same personal information is likely to 
vary between the context of a patient to doctor relationship during a medical consultation 
compared to an interviewee to interviewer relationship in relation to an employment 
application. The analysis of informational norms and component parameters are best 
conceived as juggling balls293
                                                     
286 Id. at 141. 
 that move in sync with different emphases placed on different 
balls depending on the social context involved and the privacy concern emanating.  
287 Id. at 143. Nissenbaum contends that an actor in one situation may not act in the same way as in 
another. For example, the difference between an actor in a “businessman to employee” relationship 
compared to a “parent to child” relationship. Accordingly, the capacity within which an actor may act 
has an “innumerable number of possibilities.” 
288 Id. 
289 Id. See e.g. Burdon, et al., Encryption Safe Harbours, supra note 71 (contrasting the different 
requirements for the loss of personal information involving different types of data breach). 
290 NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 275, at 145. 
291 Id.  
292 Take for example the provision of personal information directly between an individual and 
other friends via email and one via open Facebook pages. The prospect of uncontrolled, wider 
distribution may in itself act as a factor upon the release of information because there is less control 
over transmission principles. 
293 NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 275, at 145. 
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Nissenbaum developed the theory of Contextual Integrity as a “framework for determining, 
detecting, or recognizing when a [information privacy] (sic) violation has occurred.”294 To 
do so requires a comparison between entrenched and novel practices to adduce whether 
there has been a violation of context-relative informational norms.295 Privacy in Context is a 
valuable addition to the literature in that regard as it cements the importance of 
contextualization in the examination of concerns relating to the provision, protection and 
use of personal information. However, Nissenbaum acknowledges that much work has yet 
to be undertaken about how Contextual Integrity can apply to existing information privacy 
legal regimes, especially comprehensive frameworks.296
The purpose of introducing Nissenbaum’s work into this article is not to provide a 
framework for specifically assessing the weaknesses of information privacy and data breach 
notification laws but rather to reinforce the importance of applying social context to laws 
that govern the protection of personal information. The recognition that information privacy 
issues have a contextual element is integral because it focuses greater attention to key 
foundation stones, namely, social relationships, expectations of social and legal norms and 
the differing, subjective values of privacy that emanate in different guises and in different 
social circumstances. Privacy regulation has many singular facets that involve diverse 
parties that have dissimilar values relating to the protection of privacy, both at a societal and 
individual level. The protection of personal information is consequently an essentially 
contestable issue and is determined in fluid rather than static environmental circumstances. 
Laws that involve the protection of personal information need to be cognizant of the wider 
social contexts involving the creation, exchange and re-use of personal information. 
However, as highlighted in this article, both information privacy and data breach 
notification laws forsake a context dependent approach and focus on deterministic modes of 
regulation that overtly focus on specified types of information and management processes. 
The final sub-sections of this article incorporate ideas of contextualization to suggest new 
courses of action. 
  
                                                     
294 Id. at 148. 
295 Id. at 148-149. 
296 Id. at 238. Nissenbaum suggests that her theory of contextual integrity maybe more suited to 
sectoral frameworks because “it embodies informational norms relevant to specific sectors, or 
contexts, in the law.” 
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B. MORE PRIVACY, LESS INFORMATION 
The introduction of a contextual analysis assists to highlight that information privacy 
problems in relation to data breaches are not simply related to a loss of control over personal 
information. Instead, problems emerge from the breakdown of social relationships and these 
relationships vary from context to context and data breach to data breach. For example, the 
three illustrative data breaches employed in this article show that information privacy 
problems involve auxiliary third parties that are typically beyond the accountability 
framework of information privacy law. The BNP data breach297 showed that the actual 
privacy problem was exacerbated by the advent of geo-mashup creations which not only 
increased the number of generative sources available but provided a different context on 
how the list was used.298 The Pfizer data breach299, on the other hand, involved two third 
parties ulterior to the context of personal information provision, storage and use: the Pfizer 
employee’s spouse and the peer-to-peer users. Finally, the ChoicePoint breach300
The application of a contextual analysis, especially within the framework of Bennett and 
Raab’s infallibility matrix,
 involved 
identity theft-related criminals that were able to acquire individual’s personal information 
due to the lack of adequate security provided by the corporation.  
301
                                                     
297 See discussion supra Part IV.A 
 demonstrates that data breaches as information privacy 
problems are predicated upon multiple rather than binary relationships and that the 
mechanics of privacy-related problems arising from data breaches can manifest outside the 
chain of accountability created by information privacy law. Moreover, information privacy 
laws find it difficult to acknowledge the importance of multiple relationships in regard to 
data breaches because information privacy law is postulated on the regulation of 
information management processes involving defined parties. Accordingly, the issue is not 
about the length or strength of an accountability chain between singular parties. Rather, the 
issue regards how information privacy law attempts to identify and reconcile situations that 
are deemed to be ‘privacy problems.’ It is this deeming and reconciliation that is the ultimate 
limitation of information privacy law because it is management processes rather than social 
relationships that are deemed to be the problem. Regulatory remedies therefore focus on the 
provision of limited rights of control or access to that process as opposed to the provision of 
298 See e.g. Burdon, First Generation Laws, supra note 17, at 37 (outlining the role of geo-mashup 
creation in the data breach). 
299 See discussion supra Part IV.A 
300 Id. 
301 See supra note 205, and discussion. 
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remedies to actual privacy concerns. Thus, for example, a BNP member has no redress 
against a geo-mashup creator and a Pfizer employee is in the same position against a 
member of a peer-to-peer network.  
However, the ChoicePoint data breach provides a different perspective as it involves an 
ever-present figure that is partially recognized by the security principles of information 
privacy law – the computer hacker or identity theft criminal. The security principles of 
information privacy laws require organizations to maintain levels of adequate security 
regarding the storage and transfer of personal information.302 An individual who provided 
personal information to an organization was reassured that their personal information 
would be secured. Expectations are such now that if an organization has a database of 
personal information then that organization must expect an unauthorized attempt to access 
or acquire it. This is a new information security reality of our life in the information society. 
The inclusion of the hacker/identity theft criminal as an ever-present third party as a part of 
the contextual situation of personal information exchange therefore brings into play a third 
party separate to the accountability framework of information privacy law that is at least 
tangentially foreseeable. In turn, the enhanced identification of third parties touches on a 
further significant benefit of a contextual approach as it recognizes the possibilities for wider 
informational harms and injustices than those currently envisaged by information privacy 
laws.303
Nissenbaum incorporates the van den Hoven’s account of privacy which provides four 
moral justifications for information privacy in order to prevent further harms and thus 
promote equality, justice and personal autonomy.
 
304 Informational harms acknowledge that a 
much greater span of harms can arise from the unauthorized or illicit use of many types of 
personal information in many different ways.305
                                                     
302 See e.g. BYGRAVE, supra note 
 Harms consequently do not simply involve 
identity theft-related issues but can cause fear and anxiety to individuals which can lead to a 
57, at 68 (regarding the role of information security principles in 
data protection laws). 
303 See Bellia, supra note 109, at 868 (contending a requirement for a wider notion of dignitary 
harms that goes beyond material harms relating to identity theft). 
304 NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 275, at 78. See e.g. JEROEN VAN DEN HOVEN, Privacy 
and the Varieties of Moral Wrong-Doing in an Information Age, 27 SIGCAS Comput. Soc., (1997); JEROEN  
VAN DEN HOVEN, Information Technology, Privacy and the Protection of Personal Data, in INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY, (Jeroen van den Hoven & John Weckert eds., 2008). 
305  NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 275, at 78. 
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withdrawal from social life.306 Informational inequality recognizes that information 
asymmetries exist between different parties and therefore social benefits can be accrued 
disproportionately.307 Individuals may provide their personal information to organizations 
but by and large they are generally unaware about organizational uses of personal 
information and have limited roles of involvement in essentially market-based informational 
structures.308 The notion of inequality is important because it brings to the fore an analysis of 
power relationships which is largely a latent aspect of the information privacy law 
literature.309
Informational injustice refers to the importance of personal information remaining within the 
contextual sphere within which it was created and disseminated.
  
310 For example, a recent 
study by Microsoft about the employment checks conducted by human resources 
departments in four different countries found that forty three percent of US departments 
had rejected a prospective candidate based on comments provided by the candidate’s 
‘friends’ on Facebook.311 This ‘trial by friends’ would thus be considered an informational 
injustice because it not only takes information from one context and applies it in another but 
the use of information in this way ignores the crucial role of context and meekly accepts that 
what is being said is representative of an individual.312
                                                     
306 For example, a data breach concerning sensitive law enforcement related information provided 
by informers can have serious consequences that include threats or loss of life. See e.g. MICHAEL 
ISIKOFF, Missing: A Laptop of DEA Informants, Newsweek.  (2004), at 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/53958 (regarding the loss of a laptop containing informant details 
relating to investigations conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration in the US); BBC NEWS, 
MoD Inquiry After Laptop Stolen from Headquarters.  (2009), at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8409363.stm (regarding the theft of a laptop from MoD 
headquarters in the UK) and BBC NEWS, Previous Cases of Missing Data.  (2009), at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8409405.stm (regarding other instances of security failures 
involving laptops and sensitive UK government information). 
 Finally, encroachment on moral 
autonomy is linked to the situation just described as it seeks to protect an individual’s 
capacity to shape his or hers own life without undue interference and pressure to conform to 
307 NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 275, at 79. 
308 See generally Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV., 1393 (2001) (regarding a conceptual overview of the imbalance of power 
between individuals and corporations). 
309 See e.g. ROSA EHRENREICH, Privacy and Power, 89 GEO. L. J., 2055 (2001) (regarding the 
unacknowledged role of power in privacy law). 
310 NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 275, at 80. 
311 See DANIEL J SOLOVE, Googling Employees: Why Your Online Reputation Matters.  (2010), at 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/03/googling-employees-why-your-online-
reputation-matters.html (outlining the details of the study).  
312 See e.g. Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 308, at 1421 (regarding the dangers of digital 
dossiers as how bureaucracies relate database information to an accurate and entire view of 
individuals). 
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some ascribed social norm.313
The relational and harm elements of a greater contextual approach are instructive because it 
highlights some fundamental limits of information privacy law. Information privacy should 
not just relate to problems regarding the governance of a management process.
 Information privacy is therefore a key issue in society because 
it allows space for individuals to generate and fix their identity within a wider social sphere.  
314 Instead, 
information privacy should focus on problems that are inherently related to social 
relationships and their management.315 Accordingly, within the context of data breaches and 
how information privacy law responds to such issues, this article contends that a contextual 
approach is required and a greater focus on privacy rather than information is needed.  
Contextualization, thus recognizes the wider relational and harm issues that can arise 
through a context dependent analysis. Data breach concerns are not fixated to specific types 
of personal information.316
C. FROM DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION TO THE PROTECTION OF CRITICAL 
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURES  
 Information privacy problems do not simply involve providers, 
collectors and users of personal information. Regulatory and legislative remedies do not 
merely entail simplistic solutions of redress in information management processes. 
However, the problem with contextualization is that it requires a much greater legislative, 
regulatory and judicial input that information privacy law currently allows. This point is 
addressed in the final sub-section of the article in which a different view of the important 
role that data breach notification could have within the regulatory guise of protecting critical 
information infrastructures. 
As highlighted throughout this article, data breach notification laws are intended to fix the 
specific problem of identity theft threats arising from data breaches involving personal 
information through the mandatory notification of breaches to individuals. The laws also 
have an auxiliary aim of producing socially optimal side effects through the enhancement of 
corporate information security practices. Previous sections of this article have highlighted 
the limits of data breach notification law in sectoral regimes and data breach notification 
                                                     
313 NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 275, at 80. 
314 See Prischia M. Regan, The Globalization of Privacy: Implications of Recent Changes in Europe, 52 
AM. J. ECON. & SOCIO. 257, 230 (1993) (“privacy is becoming less an attribute of individuals and 
records and more an attribute of social relationships and information systems or communication 
systems") 
315 BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 25. 
316 See e.g. St. Amant, supra note 80, at 523 (highlighting that the revelation of personal health 
information can be as detrimental to an individual as financial information). 
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schemes implemented within comprehensive information privacy legal frameworks. Despite 
the issues highlighted in this article, it must noted that data breach notification laws appear 
to have been a resounding success.317
Data breach notification law inherits the same concerns of information privacy law because 
it predominantly regards information management rather than the preservation, protection 
and resolution of social relationships regarding disputes over personal information. 
Moreover, within data breach notification laws themselves, there is a large degree of blame 
attached to the breached organization within the limits of a proscribed accountability 
framework. The breached organization is deemed to be at fault and as a result  needs to 
provide notification of its failings. Notification is consequently heavily influenced by the 
concept of reputational sanction.
 They have unearthed a previously hidden social 
problem that has the capacity to negatively affect the lives of millions of people. Information 
privacy laws as applied in both sectoral and comprehensive frameworks are seriously 
lacking regards the imposition of legal obligations entailing the adequate protection of 
personal information. Accordingly, data breach notification laws have potential value and 
possibly much to offer. In concluding this article, the author asserts that the real problem 
with data breach notification is that the concept is too narrow because it has a limited notion 
of harm and it is purposively constrained by an overly context independent approach to the 
type of information regulated.  
318 However, not all organizations are to blame extensively 
particularly in situations involving sophisticated hackers.319 Some data breaches, such as the 
ChoicePoint incident320
                                                     
317 See e.g. Winn, supra note 12, at 1133 (noting the “tidal wave” of notifications thus making the 
“problem of inadequate information security...visible” while detailing potential problems with data 
breach notification law). 
 highlighted above, are based on situations involving the provision of 
318 Schwartz & Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, supra note 84 at 917. (stating that a 
significant focus of data breach notification law has been “to impose a reputational sanction on 
breached entities). 
319 See e.g. Skinner, supra note 75, at 10 (regarding the complexities of intrusion detection in 
relation to phishing attacks); KRIS ERIKSON & PHILIP N HOWARD, The Information Vulnerability 
Landscape. Compromising Positions: Organizational and Hacker Responsibility for Exposed Digital Records, in 
HARBORING DATA: INFORMATION SECURITY, LAW, AND THE CORPORATION 46, (Andrea M. Matwyshyn 
ed., 2009) (reviewing 813 publicly reported security breach incidents between 1980 and 2007 and 
confirming that a small percentage of incidents involve organizations that are “unwilling and 
unwitting victims of a malicious hacker”). 
320 See discussion supra Part IV.A 
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inadequate security measures but it needs to be recognized that some data breaches 
involving hacking attacks are ground-breaking in their levels of sophistication.321
Data breach notification laws attempt to resolve the complex problem of adequate corporate 
information security measures in a rudimentary way by mandatory notification. However, 
this remedy does not directly address the underlying issues of ineffective corporate security 
or indeed whether notification to individuals is an effective remedy.
  
322 Mandatory 
notification as a remedy simply cannot sufficiently account for the contextual realities of 
data breaches that regard complex security, social and legal concerns. As highlighted above, 
a certain type of personal information breached in one incident may have a different type of 
harm to the same information released in another data breach.323 The issue of data breach 
notification is therefore inherently contextual and requires comprehensive case by case 
analysis regarding the identification of potential harms and the application of potential 
remedies. However, this in turn requires much greater regulatory oversight than that 
currently envisaged in either sectoral or comprehensive legal frameworks because data 
breach notification is primarily directed towards the mitigation of identity theft. Data breach 
notification law attempts to provide instant consumer redress, but in doing so, it misses the 
potentially important role that the law could have regarding the wider implications of 
adequate protections of personal information within the fortification of critical information 
infrastructures.324
Fig. 3 – The role of data breach notification in light of critical information infrastructure protection 
 Data breach notification should be viewed in a comprehensively different 
perspective that regards different levels of social activity and a re-evaluation of the law’s 
role. Figure 3 below provides a diagrammatical representation. 
                                                     
321 See e.g. KIM ZETTER, Google Hack Attack Was Ultra Sophisticated, New Details Show, Wired.  (2010), 
at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/operation-aurora (regarding details of a recent 
Chinese hacking attack perpetrated on Google, Adobe and other leading US companies that was 
“unprecedented tactics that combined encryption, stealth programming and an unknown hole in 
Internet Explorer”).  
322 See Schwartz & Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, supra note 84 at 947 (“Notification 
letters supply only incomplete, discontinuous, and non-comparative information about data 
security”). 
323 See discussion supra Part IV.B 
324 See e.g. Picanso, supra note 83, at 358 (linking network attacks on personal data to critical 
information infrastructures). 
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In Figure 3, three levels of social activity are adduced: micro, meso and macro.325 The micro 
level refers to the arena of human agency in which hackers attack organizational databases 
of personal information, employees lose laptops and organizational employees notify 
individuals who take action to protect themselves. These are the base-level actions that 
generate issues and concerns regarding breaches of personal information. The meso level is 
the middle ground,326
                                                     
325 See also ANDREA M. MATWYSHYN, HARBORING DATA: INFORMATION SECURITY, LAW, AND THE 
CORPORATION 3-13  (STANFORD LAW BOOKS. 2009) (regarding a different perspective of the social 
macro, meso and micro levels entailing corporate information security). 
 the decision making arena in which corporate decisions regarding 
information security are made. These decisions are crucial regarding the advent of data 
breaches as they involve declarations of intent regarding the implementation of adequate 
protections involving personal information. The possibility that a data breach could arise is 
heavily influenced by the decisions made in the meso level. For example, if an organization 
decides to implement adequate security measures and policies then it is less likely that a 
breach will occur and vice versa. The decision arena of a smaller number of persons can 
consequently have a major impact on a much wider number of individuals at the micro 
level. Finally, the macro level regards the ground of structures and super-structures. In this 
case, it is the construct of critical information infrastructures, the underlying information 
326 See e.g. D. W. PARSONS, PUBLIC POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
POLICY ANALYSIS (EDWARD ELGAR. 1995) (“Meso analysis is a middle-range or bridging level of 
analysis which is focused on the linkage between the definition of problems, the setting of agendas 
and the decision-making and implementation processes.”).  
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and communication systems upon which both organizations and individuals are now so 
dependent.327 Again, those decisions made in the meso level have the capacity to impact 
upon the macro level as vulnerabilities arising from corporate actions can traverse both 
upwardly and downwardly through different levels. For example, a major data breach 
involving security failures in one infrastructure can have an impact on many other 
infrastructures including the irreparable damage of consumer trust.328
The actions and decisions of different levels can impact upon the structures within which 
both human and organizational actors reside. Data breaches are consequently linked to 
corporate information security management procedures which in turn reinforce or reduce 
protections related to critical information infrastructures. Accordingly, data breaches are a 
reflection of corporate information security inadequacies and the latter become weaknesses 
that need to be addressed in critical information infrastructures. A simple corporate decision 
to use an outdated type of encryption protocol on its wireless communication system can 
therefore lead to mass notification to millions of individuals and major upheaval in the 
banking sector simply because a team of sophisticated identity theft criminals gained 
unauthorized access to personal information held by the retailer.
   
329
The introduction of contextualization highlights that data breach notification is only one 
complex system within an enmeshed environment of many complex systems that interact 
and impact upon each other. The primary focus on the single issue of identity theft partially 
  
                                                     
327 Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Critical Information Infrastructure: Vulnerabilities, Threats and Responses, 3 
DISARMAMENT FORUM, 3 (2007) (outlining the reasons behind critical information infrastructure 
protection and highlighting that these infrastructures are critical because “their incapacitation or 
destruction would have a debilitating impact on the national security and the economic and social 
welfare of a state); Eugene Nickolov, Critical Information Infrastructure Protection: Analysis, Evaluation 
and Expectations, 17 INFO. & SEC., 105 (2005) (highlighting the dependency of modern societies on the 
availability and reliability of technological infrastructures); Andrew Rathmell, Protecting Critical 
Information Infrastructures, 20 COMP. & SEC., 44 (2001) (regarding the implications of the “information 
revolution” for the protection of state infrastructures). 
328 See e.g. Schwartz & Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, ™ note 84 at 928 (referring to 
the data security externality “where a data security breach at one company may cause harm at 
another company in a way that is untraceable or for which there is no legal recourse”). See also PHILIP 
E. AUERSWALD, et al., Where Private Efficiency Meet Public Vunerability: The Critical Infrastructure 
Challenge, in SEEDS OF DISASTER, ROOTS OF RESPONSE: HOW PRIVATE ACTION CAN REDUCE PUBLIC 
VULNERABILITY 8, (Philip E. Auerswald ed., 2006) (highlighting that no corporation is an island and 
the ripple effect of security breaches across economic sectors). 
329 See e.g. MATWYSHYN, supra note 325, at 3. (outlining the simplicity of the initial attack 
perpetrated on TJX Maxx that was easily avoidable); KIM ZETTER, TJX Hacker Charged With Heartland, 
Hannaford Breaches, Wired. (2009), at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/08/tjx-hacker-
charged-with-heartland/ (regarding further sophisticated attacks in the TJX incident which the 
attackers were able to penetrate most levels of data storage and the legal implications that flowed 
from the attacks). 
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recognizes some of these complexities but it does not attempt to represent them in sufficient 
complexity or depth. Some authors have made the link between data breach notification and 
the onset of a newly developing legal field, information security law.330 Equally, a link 
between corporate information security measures and the protection of critical information 
infrastructures has also been made.331
This article contends that data breach notification law needs to be considered contextually as 
part of a much wider problem that goes beyond the issue of identity theft mitigation. 
Moreover, the body of laws should not be viewed as a ‘be all and end all’ solution to 
problems relating to the inadequate protection of personal information by corporations. 
Data breach notification laws are extremely useful at highlighting problems but that does 
not mean they necessarily have the regulatory tools to remedy the problems that they 
uncover. Instead, it is more likely that the laws provide a transitory passage that attempts to 
take regulation from the identification of a significant problem (e.g. inadequate information 
security of personal information that requires notification) eventually to a potential solution 
(e.g. the implementation of effective security measures and competent monitoring). 
Notification is therefore only one element of the issue and should not be deemed as the issue 
in itself.  
 Despite the fact that these links have been recognized, 
data breach notification laws have continued to have a specific and limited remit.  
Schwartz and Janger in their influential article on regulatory structures for data breach 
notification emphasized this problem in considerable depth.332 They examined three 
regulatory models currently in operation and suggested a fourth model, the Co-ordinated 
Response Architecture (CRA) as a hybrid of the strengths and weaknesses of existing 
regimes.333 The CRA has a system of two-tier disclosure.334
                                                     
330 See generally Smedinghoff, The State of Information Security Law: A Focus on the Key Legal Trends, 
supra note 
 The first tier requires the 
breached organization to notify the CRA which then determines whether customer 
98; BH Nearon, et al., Life After Sarbannes-Oxley: The Merger of Information Security and 
Accountability, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 379, (2005).; Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk 
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CORPORATION., supra note 325; PHILIP E. AUERSWALD, SEEDS OF DISASTER, ROOTS OF RESPONSE: HOW 
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332 Schwartz & Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, supra note 84 at 960-970. 
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334 Id. See also   Burdon, et al., Encryption Safe Harbours, supra 71 (advocating a two-tier system of 
notification in relation to encryption safe harbors). 
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notification is required based on the likelihood of information misuse.335 Unlike current data 
breach notification laws, information misuse is to be construed broadly and does not simply 
relate to identity theft risks. If notification is required, the CRA will co-ordinate the sharing 
of information about a data breach, oversee the organization’s investigation and response 
and monitor notification decisions.336 The emphasis of the CRA model is mitigation response 
and notification encouragement that seeks organizational co-operation without losing the 
threat of reputational sanction.337
The protection of individuals at the micro level of society is clearly important but of equal 
importance is the protection of the macro information infrastructures that facilitate societal 
interactions and transactions. An authority such as the CRA designed for the purpose of 
ensuring critical information infrastructure protection would undoubtedly engender a 
greater regulatory focus but that emphasis can be readily justified when viewed through the 
lens of consumer and infrastructure protection via the encouragement and enforcement of 
adequate information security measures. Data breach notification laws are important but 
that importance goes beyond the specified remit of identity theft and goes to the heart of 
information-based societies. It involves the preservation of information pathways founded 
on human relations and maintained through information infrastructures. Data breach 
notification provides gives a glimpse of these wider issues that unfortunately get subsumed 
by contested arguments relating to consumer protection and corporate compliance cost 
minimization. A revision of data breach notification, and indeed information privacy, is 
required that moves beyond the limited application of individual rights to the societal 
interests everyone has regarding the protection of personal information and the modes of 
information exchange. However, a macro perspective reveals complex structures that are 
difficult to regulate but nonetheless still require governance. The forms of legal governance 
are not yet adequately defined and the issues raised by data breach notification laws 
indicate that there is still much distance to travel.  
 The mitigation response element is clearly crucial and the 
authors recognize that notification has a wider role to play within social, technical and legal 
structures.  
                                                     
335 Id. at 960 
336 Id. 
337 Id. at 968. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This article contends that both information privacy and data breach notification laws appear 
to have a similar purpose that involves the protection of personal information. However, 
both laws have fundamental differences between them and shared weaknesses within them. 
In some ways, data breach notification is too conceptually complex as it is multifaceted, 
expansive in its foundation from the California law and this expansiveness is confined by a 
focus on compliance cost mitigation. Alternatively, information privacy suffers from the 
opposite effect. The concept is too limited in focus because it attempts to regulate the process 
of personal information exchange and that provides a constraint on what is a privacy issue. 
Data breach notification in both sectoral and comprehensive approaches may therefore be a 
potentially expansive bolt-on which is implemented by a narrow focused law in an attempt 
to ascribe limited rights pertaining to an individual’s involvement in the collection, storage 
and use of their personal information. The introduction of contextualization highlights that 
both laws are predicated on certainty in order to reduce the ambiguous nature of privacy. 
Nonetheless, both laws need to include the social context of human relationships that 
underpin personal information exchange processes.  
The application of contextualization promotes a revision of both data breach notification and 
information privacy laws that moves beyond notions of individual rights related to controls 
over personal information to societal protections of essential information infrastructures. To 
do so will require new modes of regulation and the development of new types of law. These 
are complex issues especially if one considers that the process of personal information 
exchange is innately human and subject to the application of different contexts. Data breach 
notification law begins to reveal these complexities and in doing so highlights the limits of 
current information privacy laws. However, data breach notification is not a ‘be all and end 
all’ solution in itself but merely provides a signpost for a journey to be undertaken. Quite 
how that journey will manifest remains to be seen but it is seemingly clear that the first steps 
have been taken. It is likely that different directions will be charted based on the application 
of sectoral and comprehensive regimes but this article has attempted to show that future 
journeys should be mindful of the requirement for contextualization given the inherent 
tensions and weaknesses of both data breach notification and information privacy laws. 
